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ESSAY 
THE EQUIPOISE EFFECT 
Bert I. Huang *  
This Essay explores an overlooked way to use the remedy of dis-
gorgement in torts, contracts, and regulation. It begins with a reminder 
that disgorging net gains does not force the liable actor to take a loss; by 
definition, it allows him to break even. As a matter of incentives, it 
places him in a sort of equipoise. This equipoise effect has a logical up-
shot that might seem counterintuitive: Substituting disgorgement for 
any other remedy, part of the time, can emulate the incentive effect of 
using that other remedy all of the time. 
In theory, then, courts or regulators can sometimes substitute dis-
gorgement for compensatory or expectation damages without undoing 
the benefits of harm internalization. This flexibility may prove especially 
useful in contexts where harm can be hard to measure. The accuracy of 
such emulation will depend on certain ideal conditions, however, and 
circumstances such as information costs will affect whether the 
approach is feasible and attractive. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Would more polluters be deterred if they might be forced to dis-
gorge their gains rather than pay damages based on harm? Would fewer 
promises be broken if contract breach might lead to disgorgement rather 
than expectation damages? And would such effects depend on how often 
disgorgement is awarded? Controversies arising from recent common law 
innovations,1 as well as shifting regulatory strategies,2 have centered on 
questions like these about the impact of expanding the use of 
disgorgement. 
There may seem to be an easy answer: More disgorgement means 
more deterrence. After all, it is said to be an “extraordinary” remedy,3 
reserved for times when a tougher deterrent than ordinary harm-based 
damages proves necessary.4 Tellingly, courts have viewed it as too harsh a 
                                                                                                                           
 1. Most notably, the sudden endorsement of disgorgement as a contracts remedy in 
the United Kingdom has fueled a broader debate about its use in the United States, as is 
evident in the controversy concerning the promotion of disgorgement as a contracts rem-
edy in the new Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment. See A-G v. 
Blake [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.) (finding that disgorgement is an 
appropriate remedy for breach of contract in some circumstances); Caprice L. Roberts, A 
Commonwealth of Perspective on Restitutionary Disgorgement for Breach of Contract, 65 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 945, 947 (2008) (“At least two legal events telegraph a restitutionary 
sea change for the Commonwealth and the United States . . . . [T]he House of Lords’ 
decision in Attorney General v. Blake . . . [and] Section 39 of the pending American 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment.”); see also Kansas v. 
Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1064 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (excoriating the new Restatement for suggesting disgorgement as a standard remedy 
for opportunistic breach, calling the suggestion a “‘novel extension’ of the law that finds 
little if any support in case law” and merely the Restatement authors’ “aspirations for what 
the law ought to be”). 
 2. See, e.g., Press Release, FTC, FTC Withdraws Agency’s Policy Statement on 
Monetary Remedies in Competition Cases; Will Rely on Existing Law (July 31, 2012), 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/07/ftc-withdraws-agencys-policy-
statement-monetary-remedies [http://perma.cc/P75L-B9BX] (announcing withdrawal of 
2003 policy statement regarding the agency’s use of disgorgement in antitrust cases); see 
also Einer Elhauge, Disgorgement as an Antitrust Remedy, 76 Antitrust L.J. 79, 84 (2009) 
(discussing and analyzing enforcement agencies’ practices and their ability to use 
disgorgement). 
 3. Hearst Trust, FTC File No. 991-0323, at 1 (F.T.C. Dec. 14, 2001) (statement of 
Anthony & Thompson, Comm’rs), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
cases/2001/12/anthstate.htm [http://perma.cc/KBW3-XH9G] (noting disgorgement is 
an “extraordinary remedy” that should be sought “only in exceptional circumstances”). 
 4. See, e.g., James J. Edelman, Unjust Enrichment, Restitution, and Wrongs, 79 Tex. 
L. Rev. 1869, 1876 (2001) (“The cases in which disgorgement damages have been recog-
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remedy even when the express aim of liability is to prevent misconduct.5 
It is “strong medicine” to be used “sparingly,”6 we were reminded last 
year when the Supreme Court sanctioned Nebraska for siphoning off 
river water belonging to Kansas.7 In academic parlance, we sometimes say 
that the threat to take away a wrongdoer’s net gains goes beyond optimal 
deterrence to achieve complete deterrence,8 and courts seem to agree.9 
                                                                                                                           
nized have therefore been limited to instances in which there is a profound need for de-
terrence not fulfilled by compensatory damages.”); Andrew Kull, Restitution’s Outlaws, 78 
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 17, 18–19 (2003) (“Both disgorgement and punitive damages are . . . jus-
tified by the need to create a stronger disincentive to wrongful conduct—conduct that the 
threat of liability for actual damages does not adequately deter.”). 
 5. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (noting “[i]t is true, as the Government points out, that disgorgement may act to 
‘prevent and restrain’ future violations by general deterrence insofar as it makes RICO vio-
lations unprofitable” but nonetheless rejecting disgorgement as too harsh). 
 6. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1070 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Disgorgement is strong medicine, and as with other forms of equitable power, we should 
impose it against the States only sparingly.” (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131 
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring))). 
 7. In Kansas, the Court was concerned with an award of partial disgorgement in 
addition to a harm-based award; nonetheless, it appears from the Special Master’s findings 
that even the sum of the two awards was still considerably less than a full disgorgement of 
Nebraska’s profits. See id. at 1056 (majority opinion) (noting that according to the Special 
Master, the partial disgorgement award amounted to roughly half the harm-based dam-
ages but that Nebraska’s profits were likely “more than several multiples” of Kansas’s harm 
(quoting Report of the Special Master at 178, Kansas, 135 S. Ct. 1042 (No. 126))). 
 8. In contrast with “optimal deterrence,” which is meant to permit acts whose bene-
fits justify their social costs, “complete deterrence” is reserved for acts that should never 
occur. Complete deterrence occurs when the remedy is so costly to the actor that he will 
choose not to act. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive 
Damages: Theory, Empirics and Doctrine, in Research Handbook on the Economics of 
Torts 486, 488–89 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2013). There is a habit in the incentives literature, 
including in my own work, to suppose that gain-stripping sanctions achieve complete de-
terrence. See, e.g., Bert I. Huang, Concurrent Damages, 100 Va. L. Rev. 711, 713 n.7 
(2014) (equating complete deterrence with “erasing the actor’s gains”); Keith N. Hylton, 
Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 Geo. L.J. 421, 421 (1998) 
(“Generally, complete deterrence is accomplished by eliminating the prospect of gain on 
the part of the offender.”); Max Minzner, Why Agencies Punish, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
853, 861 (2012) (explaining the “complete deterrence approach” as designing penalties 
“to strip away gains rather than internalize costs”); Sharkey, supra (“The primary goal of 
gain elimination is the complete deterrence of socially unproductive activities.”). 
 9. See, e.g., SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296, 301 (2d Cir. 2014) (“By forcing 
wrongdoers to give back the fruits of their illegal conduct, disgorgement also ‘has the ef-
fect of deterring subsequent fraud.’” (quoting SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 117 (2d Cir. 
2006))); SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1474 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The primary 
purpose of disgorgement . . . is to deprive violators of their ill-gotten gains, thereby effec-
tuating the deterrence objectives of those laws.”); Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann 
Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117, 123 (9th Cir. 1968) (“[B]y removing the motive for in-
fringements, [disgorgement would] have the effect of deterring future infringements.”); 
Eriks v. Denver, 824 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Wash. 1992) (“Disgorgement of fees is a reasonable 
way to ‘discipline specific breaches of professional responsibility, and to deter future mis-
1598 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 116:1595 
 
But wait. Consider for a moment just how delicate an incentive this 
remedy really creates: Someone who expects to disgorge her net gain 
knows that her act will be neither gainful nor costly; it will be a wash.10 
She will break even. To fully persuade her not to act, then, other costs be-
yond disgorgement itself must finish the job.11 Litigation costs or oppor-
tunity costs might do it. But the remedy itself only places her on the 
fence—a precarious point of equipoise, from which she can tip either 
way.12 
Our usual rhetoric hides this fact because the way we speak about 
disgorgement often conflates the remedy itself with the trappings of its 
usage, implicitly piling on extra nonremedial costs.13 As a result, the con-
                                                                                                                           
conduct of a similar type.’” (quoting In re E. Sugar Antitrust Litig., 697 F.2d 524, 533 (3d 
Cir. 1982))). 
 10. This Essay uses the term “disgorgement” in its most ideal sense: damages that 
remove the marginal net gains (or marginal net savings) relative to the actor’s best alter-
native noninfringing course of action. For example, in the torts context, that amount may 
be the net savings from failing to take adequate precautions. The consequences of mis-
measuring such marginal net gains or marginal net savings are considered at length 
throughout this Essay, especially in Parts I and III. At the outset, however, it should be 
noted as a matter of terminology that in practice some remedies labeled “disgorgement” 
fail to offset part of the actor’s costs (including opportunity costs) by neglect or by design; 
some go still further to require the actor to give up profits not attributable to the infring-
ing choice, or even gross gains. See infra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing 
quasi-punitive versions of disgorgement). 
 11. The theoretical literature does at times recognize that when we speak of 
“disgorgement” as achieving complete deterrence, we should better understand the term 
as shorthand for disgorgement plus something extra. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Punitive 
Damages, Social Norms, and Economic Analysis, 60 Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 
1997, at 73, 78 (1997) [hereinafter Cooter, Punitive Damages] (“When the goal of law is to 
deter injurer’s from committing forbidden acts, the injurer’s gain, not the victim’s loss, 
provides the correct baseline for computing damages. Under ideal conditions—including 
certain liability—a small increment added to perfectly disgorging damages will deter.”); A. 
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Liability Be Based on the Harm to the Victim 
or the Gain to the Injurer?, 10 J.L. Econ. & Org. 427, 428 (1994) [hereinafter Polinksy & 
Shavell, Harm or Gain] (noting gain-based liability achieves deterrence by “making the 
injurer disgorge his gain (or a little more)”). 
 12. See, e.g., Cooter, Punitive Damages, supra note 11, at 77 (“‘Perfect disgorge-
ment’ is a sum of money that leaves the injurer indifferent between the injury with liability 
for damages or no injury.”); Benjamin E. Hermalin, Avery W. Katz & Richard Craswell, 
Contract Law, in 1 Handbook of Law & Economics § 5.3.2, at 116 (2007) (A. Mitchell 
Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (“Disgorgement damages, if assessed with certainty, 
leave the breaching party indifferent between performance and breach.”). I use the term 
“equipoise” rather than the economics term “indifference” because, in common parlance, 
saying that someone is indifferent to something may suggest a mild sense of disfavor—and 
thus the term “indifference” may misleadingly suggest that the contemplated act is disfa-
vored—whereas the intended meaning is that the actor neither strictly prefers inaction 
over action, nor strictly prefers action over inaction. The term “equipoise” crisply conveys 
this intended meaning. 
 13. Part III examines such costs, including litigation costs, reputation costs, oppor-
tunity costs, and the implicit expected costs created (in some contexts) by allowing the 
plaintiff to choose the remedy. 
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ventional discourse has also lulled us into overlooking how we might em-
brace disgorgement’s equipoise effect and use it to good advantage. 
This Essay will suggest ways for courts and regulators to do so. Its 
primary aim, however, is to develop a theoretical point—a logical impli-
cation of the equipoise effect: Substituting disgorgement for any other remedy, 
part of the time, can emulate the incentive effect of using that other remedy all of 
the time. 
To see this more vividly, imagine meeting the founder of a tech start-
up in the Bay Area. Suppose that she expects to be held liable for patent 
infringement if she uses a certain technology without license.14 Also sup-
pose that patent remedies are designed such that a prospective infringer 
might have to disgorge her net profits (thus breaking even), or alterna-
tively, might have to pay compensation for harm to the patentee (thus 
keeping her profits while also paying for the patentee’s loss).15 
Anticipating this uncertain mix of potential remedies, the start-up 
founder should be expected to make the same decision as if she faced 
only the harm-based damages with certainty. If her profits from infring-
ing would exceed the compensation she would have to pay, then it is 
worthwhile for her to infringe—whether she expects to enjoy that net 
gain for sure, or only with some probability. Likewise, if her profits would 
fall short of the compensation she would have to pay, then it is not 
worthwhile for her to infringe—whether she faces that net loss for sure, 
or only with some probability.16 
The underlying logic is simple. Some chance of breaking even, but 
otherwise enjoying a net gain, is still a net gain overall. Some chance of 
breaking even, but otherwise suffering a net loss, is still a net loss overall. 
Thus, the occasional possibility of having to disgorge profits instead of 
paying compensation should leave an actor’s decision unchanged relative 
                                                                                                                           
 14. It is assumed, for the sake of exposition, that she will face liability with certainty if 
she infringes. See infra note 31 (addressing the possibility of imperfect enforcement).  
 15. This remedies structure is hypothetical, though it is somewhat similar to how 
patent damages sometimes play out in reality, often to some controversy. As a formal mat-
ter, the current regime requires harm-based damages and no longer allows disgorgement 
of the infringer’s profits as a remedy per se, with the exception of design patents. (A cau-
tionary note about the terminology of patent remedies: An infringer’s profits, which is a 
measure of gain, should not be confused with a patent holder’s “lost profits,” which is a 
measure of harm.) See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable 
Royalties, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 655, 655 (2009) [hereinafter Lemley, Distinguishing 
Lost Profit] (“Patent damages are designed to compensate patentees for their losses, not 
punish accused infringers or require them to disgorge their profits.”). Yet some courts are 
starting to use the infringer’s profits as a benchmark for reasonable royalties. See William 
C. Rooklidge, Infringer’s Profits Redux: The Analytical Method of Determining Patent 
Infringement Reasonable Royalty Damages, Bloomberg BNA (Feb. 4, 2015), http:// 
www.bna.com/infringers-profits-redux-n17179922755/ [http://perma.cc/BWL4-K4KN]. 
 16. The discussion here assumes that these are the only incentives at work (for exam-
ple, it assumes that the infringement entails no further penalties). 
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to a standard compensatory regime.17 The possible substitution of dis-
gorgement dilutes her incentives—but thanks to the equipoise effect, her 
incentives continue to point her toward the same decision.18 
This theoretical observation cuts across the standard debates. Those 
who bristle at the notion of efficient breach or optimal deterrence have 
long urged the greater use of disgorgement as a way to increase deter-
rence.19 Meanwhile, their opponents favor the usual harm-based dam-
ages, pointing to the familiar behavioral benefits of forcing actors to 
internalize the harms they cause.20 But both views are incomplete. 
As we have just seen, the logic of the equipoise effect implies that a 
court or a public enforcer may be able to substitute disgorgement some 
of the time, in place of harm-based damages, without altering the overall 
effect on behavior. To put it more generally, if the actor is uncertain 
about whether the remedy she must pay will be disgorgement or harm-
based damages, then the resulting incentive effect emulates that which 
results from facing harm-based damages for sure. This may be welcome 
                                                                                                                           
 17. This reasoning is expressed more formally in section I.A. 
 18. Such dilution can distort her choices, however, if there are other incentives at 
work; sections I.D.3, II.B.2, and III.C address this concern about dilution and “leftover 
incentives” in more depth. For now, it is worth re-emphasizing that this Essay uses the 
term “disgorgement” in the ideal sense of removing all marginal net gains (or net savings) 
relative to the actor’s best noninfringing alternative course of action; in this sense, accu-
rate disgorgement accounts for any leftover incentives. 
 19. See Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1057 (2015) (noting that “awarding ac-
tual damages for a compact’s infringement may be inadequate, because that remedy alone 
‘would permit [an upstream State] to ignore its obligation to deliver water as long as it is 
willing’ to pay that amount” (quoting Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 132 (1987))); id. 
at 1059 (noting that the threat of disgorgement “will adequately guard against Nebraska’s 
repeating its former practices”); see also Nat’l Merch. Corp. v. Leyden, 348 N.E.2d 771, 
776 (Mass. 1976) (presenting Justice Benjamin Kaplan’s argument that “an intending 
tortfeasor should not be prompted to speculate that his profits might exceed the injured 
party’s losses, thus encouraging commission of the tort” and upholding a disgorgement-
based award).  
 20. As the Utah Supreme Court put it, “We are persuaded by the efficient breach 
arguments discussed above. When an efficient breach occurs, a breaching party may retain 
its profits in excess of a plaintiff’s losses as long as the plaintiff is made whole.” TruGreen 
Cos. v. Mower Bros., 199 P.3d 929, 935 (Utah 2008); see also Barry E. Adler, Efficient 
Breach Theory Through the Looking Glass, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1679, 1693 (2008) 
(“Theoretical qualifications and refinements aside, however, expectation damages are 
both the doctrinal norm and a tolerably proficient mechanism for encouraging efficient 
breach and investment decisions.” (footnote omitted)); E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or 
My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 Yale L.J. 
1339, 1381–83 (1985) [hereinafter Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain?] (explaining how 
expectation damages enable efficient breach but noting that efficient breach occurs also 
under disgorgement if transaction costs are zero). Cf. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1069 (Thomas, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“If disgorgement is an antidote for ‘efficient 
breach,’ then it need only be administered when ‘conscious advantage-taking’ and ‘oppor-
tunistic calculation’ are present.”). 
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news for those favoring harm internalization, but disappointing for those 
promoting disgorgement as the sure path to stronger deterrence. 
Internalizing harm is not the only aim, moreover, that can be emu-
lated in this way. The underlying logic extends to other incentives that 
the law may seek to create by imposing remedies, including complete 
deterrence.21 Furthermore, such flexibility in switching between reme-
dies may also ease the tradeoffs with nondeterrence concerns in a given 
case, such as distributional effects or certain notions of justice.22 
In theory, at least. Part I details three ideal conditions for the under-
lying logic of emulation to work. Much of the analysis that follows will 
examine departures from these conditions. It is worth noting here, how-
ever, two conditions that are not required: First, nothing about the un-
derlying logic requires that the harms and the gains be similar in value. 
The logic works not because gains are serving as a proxy for harms, but 
because of the equipoise effect. Second, the logic does not rely on the 
use of a liability test for predetermining which acts should be deterred.23 
Part II develops one particular application for this logic, showing 
how such a substitution strategy can be used to work around a common 
problem for courts and regulators—the fact that harm-based damages 
can often be hard to measure. A typical response in the law of remedies 
has long been to resist counting certain types of losses in compensatory 
                                                                                                                           
 21. For example, consider an actor who faces some chance of breaking even, due to 
disgorgement, but who will otherwise pay a penalty ensuring a net loss. Overall, he will 
expect a net loss. Thus, he will be deterred, even though he could break even sometimes. 
It may seem ironic that one could say he is deterred despite the use of disgorgement. See 
infra section I.A. (demonstrating this logic as applied to complete deterrence). 
 22. The strategy proposed here thus shares a kinship in spirit—although it is quite 
distinct in mechanism and logic—with an innovative proposal by Professor Richard Brooks 
in the contracts context. Professor Brooks proposes allowing the promisee an option be-
tween forcing performance and receiving disgorgement damages, rather than the stand-
ard approach of allowing the promisor the option of performing or paying expectation 
damages. Richard R.W. Brooks, The Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 Yale L.J. 568, 
581–84 (2006). Notably, Professor Brooks analyzes the efficiency of the promisee’s choice 
under his hypothetical promisee’s-option scheme, id., whereas this Essay analyzes the prom-
isor’s choice under a different hypothetical scheme that does not involve shifting the 
choice to the promisee but rather involves the mixing of remedies. 
 23. The proposed remedial combination itself sorts between efficient and inefficient 
acts, just as a purely harm-based damages regime would do, under strict liability. Note that 
this feature distinguishes this Essay’s contribution from other analyses of gain-based dam-
ages that do assume such a test at the liability stage for sorting between efficient (or desir-
able) and inefficient (or undesirable) acts. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, 
Disgorgement Damages for Accidents, 44 J. Legal Stud. 249, 250–53 (2015) (assuming the 
use of a liability test such as negligence or community standard of care and applying dis-
gorgement as the “minimum damages that deter” an act that has thus been deemed un-
desirable); Hylton, supra note 8, at 421, 433–34 (assuming the use of a liability test 
comparing costs and gains as a precondition for applying a gain-based remedy and noting 
that “complete deterrence is accomplished by eliminating the prospect of gain on the part 
of the offender”). 
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damages;24 the result is systematic underdeterrence. But an alternative 
solution, enabled by the equipoise effect, is to substitute disgorgement 
when harm-based damages are biased or hard to assess.25 Such an ap-
proach may be more attractive for certain public enforcement actions in 
which societal harm may be hard to prove, individual compensation may 
not be a pressing concern,26 and setting accurate incentives is a pressing 
concern. 
Part III turns to the various additional costs that often do push an 
actor from equipoise over to complete deterrence, including litigation 
costs, reputation costs, and opportunity costs. Such costs are fairly obvi-
ous, and the analysis will not belabor them; rather, it focuses on how 
such costs might alter the effectiveness of the proposed substitution strat-
egy. It also addresses the complications that arise when a plaintiff is al-
lowed to choose between pursuing a harm-based or a gain-based award.27 
Several limitations of scope are worth noting at the outset. First, as 
this Essay focuses on deterrence, it will not delve into the vast trove of ex 
post distributional concerns and expressive purposes that have tradition-
ally animated much of the law of restitution and unjust enrichment.28 
Second, in the contracts context, the analysis will focus only on the 
breach-or-perform decision.29 Third, most of the exposition will assume 
that the infringing act causes harm with certainty,30 and that liability is 
                                                                                                                           
 24. See, e.g., Freund v. Wash. Square Press, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 419, 422 (N.Y. 1974) 
(noting that the “amount of royalties plaintiff would have realized was not ascertained 
with adequate certainty and, as a consequence, plaintiff may recover nominal damages 
only”); Steven F. Napolitano & Peter Luneau, Speculating About Speculative Damages, 
N.Y. L.J., Jan. 17, 2012 (collecting recent cases). 
 25. The assumption here is that the actor’s gains are measurable, even though the 
harms might not be. But the actor’s gains can also be hard to measure, of course. See, e.g., 
Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1058 (“Notably, Kansas does not insist on all of Nebraska’s gain. It 
recognizes the difficulty of ascertaining that figure, given the evidence the parties 
presented.”). This important tradeoff is noted throughout this Essay, including a more 
focused discussion in section I.E. 
 26. This is not to ignore the fact that some regulatory enforcers have also used dis-
gorgement awards as a means of compensating private parties—most notably the SEC, 
using its “fair funds” statutory mechanism, and the FTC, using disgorgement awards to 
create consumer compensation funds. See infra note 108 (describing SEC “fair funds” and 
FTC use of disgorgement). 
 27. See section III.D (addressing remedial regimes with plaintiff’s election of reme-
dies, such as in cases of conscious wrongdoing, certain fiduciary breaches, and copyright 
violations). 
 28. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, The Law and Ethics of Restitution (2004); Ward 
Farnsworth, Restitution: Civil Liability for Unjust Enrichment (2014) [hereinafter 
Farnsworth, Restitution]. 
 29. How earlier choices—such as contract design, price, reliance, investment, or 
precautions—might be affected by remedial mixing (operating as a default rule) is a rich 
inquiry left for future work. 
 30. As Part I notes, because the exposition assumes that the infringing act results in 
harm with certainty, an adaptation in interpretation and in implementation is needed to 
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sure to follow,31 although the analysis will also illustrate how the core idea 
can be applied in cases of imperfect enforcement.32 
Tradeoffs abound in the terrain to be explored—the aims of com-
pensation and procedural justice compete with the aim of deterrence, 
errors of one kind compete with errors of another, and courts and en-
forcers must make do with imperfect information or else fail to act. If at 
times this Essay’s exposition suggests a theoretical neatness, it is only for 
clarity’s sake and should not be read as making easy assumptions about 
reality.33 And it goes without saying that other reasons to use or eschew 
disgorgement may conflict or coexist with those introduced here. 
I. EQUIPOISE AND EQUIVALENCE 
For the listener, who listens in the snow, 
And, nothing himself, beholds 
Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is.34 
This Part develops the core theoretical point of this Essay. It begins 
by explaining how the incentive effect of any remedy can be emulated by 
a probabilistic mix of that remedy and disgorgement, inducing the actor 
to make the same choices—a situation we might call “choice equiva-
lence.” It then articulates three ideal conditions for choice equivalence 
and details the consequences of departures from each of these condi-
                                                                                                                           
apply the basic logic to infringing acts that generate a risk of harm but do not always result 
in harm. See infra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
 31. The classic solution to the problem of imperfect enforcement—that is, the 
possibility that the actor might get away with no liability despite causing harm—is to apply 
a damages multiplier. Such an application will be illustrated in section II.C. But a fuller 
analysis can be quite complex, as Professor Richard Craswell has shown. See Richard 
Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 Mich. 
L. Rev. 2185, 2193–98 (1999) [hereinafter Craswell, Deterrence and Damages] (illustrat-
ing a range of complications for the multiplier principle, such as when the probability of 
sanction is correlated with the magnitude of harm). 
 32. See infra section II.C (incorporating the classic damages multiplier into the 
analysis and illustrating how the logic of emulation creates some flexibility in using such 
multipliers). 
 33. Among the myriad possible complications bracketed here are risk aversion and 
insurance, behavioral heuristics or biases, the victim’s or nonbreacher’s incentives, bilat-
eral accidents, the costs of enforcement and incentives to sue, renegotiation, Coasian bar-
gaining, judgment-proof actors, overlapping regulatory regimes, and uncertain legal 
standards. As is conventional in the incentives literature, this Essay’s analysis assumes that 
actors are aware of the remedies that they may face (although this assumption can and 
should be questioned, of course). Whether actors need to know exactly how often dis-
gorgement will be substituted is an interesting question addressed in sections I.D.1 and 
I.E.1. The issue of information costs for the courts or public enforcers—including the 
possibility that gains or harms cannot be easily determined—will be raised throughout, 
with emphasis at the end of Part I and in Part II. 
 34. Wallace Stevens, The Snow Man, in Harmonium 16, 17 (1923). 
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tions. The exposition thus begins at a high level of abstraction, before 
Part II turns to a set of potential applications. 
A few preliminary notes are in order: The terms “disgorgement” and 
“gain-based damages” will be used interchangeably throughout this Essay 
to mean an amount of damages that removes the marginal net gains (or 
marginal net savings) relative to the actor’s best alternative noninfring-
ing course of action.35 In general, the exposition will speak as if the actor 
faces a binary choice between not acting (and thus incurring no gains, 
no harm, and no liability) and acting (and thus incurring gains, harm, 
and the costs of liability).36 This setup naturally suits strict liability 
contexts, including contract breach;37 it can also be adapted to fit a 
simplistic version of a negligence regime.38 
                                                                                                                           
 35. This meaning corresponds to what Professor Robert Cooter has called “perfect 
disgorgement” and others simply call “disgorgement.” See Cooter, Punitive Damages, 
supra note 11; Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain?, supra note 20, at 1343 (noting that 
“[w]hen one speaks of ‘gain’ in the context of the disgorgement principle, one means 
gain that is in some sense caused by the breach of contract” and thus should not include 
“the profit [that] could have resulted had there been no breach of contract”). This is not 
to ignore the possibility of errors in assessing this measure, as sections I.D and III.C will 
emphasize. See also infra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrinal or 
judicial strategy of refusing to offset certain costs as a deliberate way to add a quasi-
punitive measure beyond this ideal disgorgement amount). 
 36. Also note that for convenience, this Essay will generally adopt the simplistic 
phrasing of saying that an actor “will” act whenever there are positive net incentives to do 
so (among a relatively immediate set of incentives, usually), as if all characters are 
Holmesian bad men. This is not meant as a description of human or institutional be-
havior, of course, but a shorthand that is conventional and convenient for the theoretical 
analysis of law-created incentives and deterrence. 
 37. An adaptation of the interpretation and implementation of the basic logic is 
needed, however, in order to apply it to infringing acts that generate a risk of harm but do 
not always result in harm—which is presumably more often the case with tortious acts than 
with contract breach. For such situations, we need to reinterpret the actor’s binary choice 
as between not acting and the entire course of action that has led to the harm (or would 
cause such harm in expectation). As recognized in the literature, one way to implement 
this conception is to consider the actor’s entire (real) course of action, including occa-
sions on which harm did not materialize even though the actor performed the risk-creat-
ing act (and thus enjoyed net gains or net savings that should be counted in the dis-
gorgement award); another way is to apply a damages multiplier to approximate the net 
gains or net savings from a (perhaps fictional) version of such an entire course of action. 
See, e.g., Cooter & Porat, supra note 23, at 258–67 (proposing several forms of disgorge-
ment multipliers to account for such probabilistic harm or probabilistic enforcement); 
Saul Levmore & William J. Stuntz, Remedies and Incentives in Private and Public Law: A 
Comparative Essay, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 483, 484–86 (explaining shortfall if the accounting 
omits the occasions that created risk but did not end up causing harm). 
 38.  To adapt the analysis to a negligence regime, it is useful to consider two types of 
situations. In the first, the actor’s best nonliable alternative is not to act at all; in other 
words, the actor faces a binary choice between acting without due care and not acting. The 
basic logic can then be interpreted in a straightforward way (because the actor is sure to 
be liable if she acts), just as it can under a strict liability regime. In the second type of situ-
ation, the actor’s best nonliable alternative is to act with due care; in other words, the actor 
faces a binary choice between acting without due care and acting with due care. Here, by 
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A. Choice Equivalence 
To fix ideas, let us label as the “primary” remedy whatever the law 
has set up as the default remedy in a given context. This shift to a more 
general terminology is purposeful: Although much of the discussion thus 
far has focused on compensatory damages or expectation damages, the 
logic elaborated here extends beyond harm-based damages. 
First, suppose that a certain primary remedy will cause a net loss for 
the actor whenever it is ordered, because the remedy will cost her more 
than she will gain from the act that creates the liability. Examples might 
be heavy criminal fines, civil penalties, or punitive damages. If the actor 
anticipates facing this primary remedy with certainty, then she expects a 
net loss; she is completely deterred. But now suppose instead that the 
actor expects some chance of paying disgorgement in lieu of this primary 
remedy. Thus she faces some chance of breaking even (due to disgorge-
ment) and otherwise a net loss (due to the primary remedy). Overall, she 
still faces an expected net loss; again, she is deterred. 
Illustration—Fraud. The consumer protection agency seeks 
to completely deter sellers of herbal supplements from making 
fraudulent claims. In many cases, the agency applies civil penal-
ties that exceed the seller’s profits resulting from the fraud; but 
sellers know that sometimes, for idiosyncratic reasons, the 
agency will instead seek only the disgorgement of those profits. 
The incentive effect of this probabilistic mix of remedies is still 
complete deterrence; even though sellers will sometimes break 
even, overall they expect a net loss. 
The same logic applies if the primary remedy is one that leaves the 
actor with a net gain. An example might be a lenient civil fine. If the ac-
tor anticipates facing such a primary remedy with certainty, then she will 
not be deterred; she will have an incentive to act. But suppose instead 
that the actor expects some chance of paying disgorgement in lieu of this 
primary remedy. Thus she expects some chance of breaking even (due to 
disgorgement) and otherwise a net gain (due to the primary remedy). 
Again she is not deterred, as overall she still faces an expected net gain 
from the act. 
                                                                                                                           
definition, the amount to be disgorged is the marginal net gain or net savings (including 
savings from forgoing precautions) from acting without due care relative to acting with 
due care. Likewise, the relevant amount of harm-based damages for the present analysis is 
also the marginal increase in harm from acting without due care relative to acting with 
due care. This amount corresponds to the usual measure of compensatory or expectation 
damages if no harm would occur if the actor acted with due care (but not if some harm 
would still occur). Beyond this simplistic adaptation, however, this Essay’s analysis should 
not be assumed to apply to a more complex characterization of a negligence regime, to 
liability regimes based on intent, or to regimes that take the other party’s behavior into 
account (such as comparative negligence). The present analysis also does not address con-
tinuous, rather than discrete, choice sets. These would be important and useful extensions 
to pursue. 
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Many common remedies work in both directions, of course. They 
are designed to tip the actor sometimes in favor of acting and sometimes 
against acting, depending on whether the actor’s gains will exceed the 
cost of the remedy. An example might be compensatory damages or a 
carefully calibrated regulatory fee. By the same logic as the prior scenar-
ios, the overall incentive effect of such a primary remedy can be emu-
lated by a probabilistic mix of that remedy and of disgorgement. This was 
illustrated in the patent remedies scenario in the Introduction;39 it is re-
stated in slightly more general terms here. 
Illustration—Reasonable Royalty. Imagine an intellectual 
property statute that is designed to allow infringement when the 
user is willing to pay a reasonable royalty, but to deter infringe-
ment when the user is unwilling to pay that amount.40 When the 
accurate amount of a reasonable royalty can be proved, the 
court will award that amount as damages; when the amount is 
difficult to prove, however, the statute permits the court in its 
discretion to award instead a disgorgement of profits attributa-
ble to the infringement.41 If the user is uncertain which course 
the court will take—and thus anticipates some chance of paying 
the royalty but otherwise disgorging profits—then the user faces 
incentives that mimic the effect of a regime where the award is 
always the royalty. 
The simple logic at work can be expressed more formally as follows: 
Suppose the actor faces the primary remedy—call it r—with probability 
p, but otherwise faces disgorgement. If the actor chooses to act, she will 
enjoy a gain of g. Thus, the actor faces some chance p of ending up with 
(g - r), but otherwise breaks even, and so she has a positive incentive to 
act if p(g - r) > 0. This reduces to (g - r) > 0 for p > 0, which means that 
she has a positive incentive to act if her gains will be greater than the 
primary remedy and if she expects some positive chance of facing the 
primary remedy. Notice that (g - r) > 0 is also the condition for her to 
                                                                                                                           
 39. See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text. 
 40. This hypothetical regime resembles the state of the law for patent damages, 
which sets reasonable royalties as a minimum measure of damages (at least, when the pa-
tentee is a nonpracticing entity, and thus the “lost profits” measure of harm-based dam-
ages generally does not apply). See Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profit, supra note 15, at 
661–69 (analyzing controversy surrounding courts’ methods for calculating reasonable 
royalties). The central statutory provision is 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (permitting damages 
“adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable 
royalty for the use made of the invention”). The illustration excludes the possibility of 
further sanctions, such as treble damages. 
 41. The possibility of disgorgement remedies for patent infringement is not entirely 
imaginary, as it has been permitted by earlier statutes and remains the subject of some 
debate. See, e.g., Caprice L. Roberts, The Case for Restitution and Unjust Enrichment 
Remedies in Patent Law, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 653, 654–70 (2010) (describing the 
history of federal patent law, including the possibility of disgorgement as a remedy prior to 
1964, summarizing the current debate over measures of patent remedies, and arguing for 
Congress and courts to consider the revival of disgorgement). 
2016] THE EQUIPOISE EFFECT 1607 
 
have a positive incentive to act if she were to face the primary remedy 
with certainty. Likewise, she would be deterred if p(g - r) < 0, which 
reduces to (g - r) < 0 for p > 0.42 Thus, whether the actor faces the 
probabilistic mix of remedies or only the primary remedy, the resulting 
incentive effects are equivalent in the sense that they will induce the 
same choice.43 
The ideal conditions for such emulation are detailed below. But be-
fore moving on, it is worth emphasizing that the underlying logic is not 
limited to contexts in which the primary remedy is some form of harm-
based damages. Notice that in the fraud illustration above, the primary 
remedy being emulated is punitive; the aim (and the result) is complete 
deterrence. And in the intellectual property illustration, the primary 
remedy being emulated is a court-determined price; depending on the 
regulatory scheme, such a price may or may not reflect the harm done.44 
For practical reasons, however, most of this Essay will focus on con-
texts in which the typical primary remedy is some form of harm-based 
damages, such as expectation damages or compensatory damages. The 
next section thus turns our focus to the special case of emulating harm 
internalization. 
                                                                                                                           
 42. The condition p = 0 corresponds to a regime where disgorgement is always used, 
and so the equivalence concept has no use. This is why p > 0 is listed as one of the 
conditions for choice equivalence in section I.D. The condition (g - r) = 0 only occurs if 
the primary remedy is also disgorgement itself (and so again the equivalence concept has 
no use) or if the value of the primary remedy matches the disgorgement amount in a 
given scenario (in which case equivalence occurs because the primary remedy itself also 
puts the actor in equipoise). 
 43. Again, one should not conflate the equivalence proposed here (and the form of 
substitution suggested here) with the different type of equivalence (and another type of 
substitution) found in Professor Brooks’s innovative “efficient performance” approach. 
See supra note 22. 
 44. In the case of patents, for example, the “reasonable royalty” rate can be sensibly 
understood as a measure of harm in the case of nonpracticing patentees (after all, what 
they lost was the fee they would have charged for a license). See, e.g., Lemley, 
Distinguishing Lost Profit, supra note 15, at 655–56. The same measure, however, is only a 
backstop (minimal) measure of damages in the case of practicing patentees who are 
unable to prove their true “lost profits.” Id. Note that this Essay’s intellectual property 
illustrations assume hypothetical aims for imaginary remedial regimes to show the 
mechanics of the emulation logic, but do not mean to imply any argument about the 
broader public welfare or about how static and dynamic efficiencies interact. See, e.g., 
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698, 698–701 (1998) (analyzing 
problems of dynamic efficiency—meaning innovation—in the context of biomedical 
patents); C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a 
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 NYU L. Rev. 1553, 1556 (2006) (reviewing arguments in 
antitrust and patent literatures on static and dynamic efficiency); Mark A. Lemley, 
Industry-Specific Antitrust Policy for Innovation, 2011 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 637, 638–39 
(2011) (discussing the tradeoff between static and dynamic efficiency); Jonathan Masur, 
Patent Inflation, 121 Yale L.J. 470, 480 (2011) (same). 
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B. Harm Internalization 
Torts and contracts damages are normally harm-based measures—
compensatory damages and expectation damages, respectively.45 These 
harm-based damages create incentives that are conventionally thought to 
promote efficient choices. In torts, we say that harm internalization 
serves optimal deterrence,46 and in contracts, we say that it provides effi-
cient incentives for the breach-or-perform decision.47 For these reasons, 
this Essay gives extra attention to choice equivalence when the primary 
remedy is damages based on harm.48 
                                                                                                                           
 45. One distinction is salient, however. In the contracts context, the doctrines 
governing remedies, including expectation damages, are default rules. One might then 
ask: Would the remedial mixes proposed in this Essay be ones that parties with incomplete 
contracts would have wished for? And if courts were to impose such remedial mixes, how 
might parties react in setting contract prices? Analysis of these questions is left for future 
work, but two tentative observations might be ventured here. First, if the parties’ contrac-
tual purpose is to allow (only) efficient breaches, the substitution strategies suggested here 
may well be what the parties themselves would wish for, given that these strategies may 
serve efficient breach as effectively as (or possibly better than) expectation damages alone 
would. See section II.B (explaining when a substitution strategy can serve the aims of harm 
internalization better than a purely harm-based damages regime). If so, moreover, some of 
this Essay’s analysis may offer guidance to such parties on drafting a liquidated damages 
clause that incorporates the substitution strategy. Second, and somewhat contrarily, 
expectation damages might not be the remedial rule that all parties would choose for 
themselves. See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case 
Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1428, 1430–31 (2004) (analyz-
ing why parties may be willing to pay ex ante for non-harm-based remedial provisions and 
providing counterexamples including free-return policies and airline ticket-change fees). 
For a survey of scholarly views on how default rules should be set, see Hermalin, Katz, & 
Craswell, supra note 12, § 4.3.2. 
 46. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 Yale 
L.J. 347, 365 (2003) [hereinafter Sharkey, Punitive Damages] (noting that the threat of 
damages measured by calculating aggregate tortious loss leads to “optimal deterrence” 
and that “[t]he goal is to force tortfeasors, and others similarly situated, to internalize the 
harms to society caused by their conduct”). 
 47. The literature related to efficient breach is vast, of course. See Avery Katz, Virtue 
Ethics and Efficient Breach, 45 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 777, 777–78 (2011) (surveying the litera-
ture and noting that “[c]ontracts scholars have been arguing over the concept of ‘efficient 
breach’ for over thirty years . . . . yet the debate fails to subside”). For one court’s en-
dorsement, see TruGreen Cos. v. Mower Bros., 199 P.3d 929, 935 (Utah 2008) (“We are 
persuaded by the efficient breach arguments discussed above. When an efficient breach 
occurs, a breaching party may retain its profits in excess of a plaintiff’s losses as long as the 
plaintiff is made whole.”). Some who criticize the concept have nonetheless recognized 
other efficiency-related justifications for expectation damages. See, e.g., Daniel Markovits 
& Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses of the Expectation Interest, 
97 Va. L. Rev. 1939, 1989 (2011) (criticizing efficient-breach theory but recognizing other 
“efficiency gains generated by expectations damages”). 
 48. The analysis will bracket reasons why harm internalization might not be efficient, 
such as the problem of multiple margins, but extensions investigating such complications 
would be useful. See Richard Craswell, Instrumental Theories of Compensation: A Survey, 
40 San Diego L. Rev. 1135, 1139, 1149 (2003) (summarizing the classical view that harm 
internalization through compensatory or expectation damages is desirable but cataloguing 
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Illustration—Chemical Spill. Cyana, Inc., is a manufacturer 
that transports Chemical X on train lines running through ma-
jor urban areas. One of Cyana’s train cars is leaking and will 
spill chemicals on the next leg of its journey. Cyana expects to 
be held strictly liable for the spill. The standard remedy is com-
pensatory damages, but suppose that if the court deems the 
harm to be too difficult to measure, the court may instead re-
quire Cyana to disgorge its savings from not replacing the leaky 
car on that trip. Facing this uncertainty, is Cyana more likely to 
replace the leaky car than if it faced compensatory damages for 
sure?49 
The answer is no. If Cyana’s savings fall short of the harm caused by 
the spill, then it will choose to replace the car. This will occur even if 
there is a chance the court will require disgorgement of its savings, 
because Cyana still anticipates some remaining chance of suffering a net 
loss from having to pay compensation. Likewise, it will not replace the 
car if its savings exceed the harm. 
Note that this illustration assumes a strict liability regime. Nothing in 
the underlying logic relies on any liability threshold, such as the pre-
balancing of harm and gains in the Learned Hand version of negligence. 
Among other things, this means that the logic can be applied to contract 
breach.50 
Illustration—Exclusive Sales Agreements. The manufacturer 
Only Toys contracts with the retail chain Costmart not to sell 
any of its competitors’ goods. Costmart is considering breaching 
by selling toys made by a competitor that are dissimilar to any 
product made by Only Toys. This breach would increase 
Costmart’s profits while only slightly reducing profits for Only 
Toys. Costmart anticipates that a court might award expectation 
                                                                                                                           
reasons developed in more recent literature challenging that view); id. at 1149 (noting 
that “the remedy that is most efficient in serving one goal might not be the most efficient 
in serving another” and that “there are many different ‘margins’ along which parties 
might adjust their behavior, and different remedies may have different effects along each 
of those margins”). It is worth a reminder here, however, that choice equivalence is not 
limited to harm internalization. 
 49. This illustration is loosely based on the classic torts case of Indiana Harbor Belt 
Railroad v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.). Readers 
who remember the case may already be anticipating the contest between negligence and 
strict liability that will play out at the end of Part I. See infra section I.E.2 (exploring 
implications of the logic of emulation for the choice between negligence and strict 
liability). 
 50. In the contracts context, this Essay focuses solely on incentives at the breach-or-
perform stage. Analogous reasoning may offer guidance in setting ideal damages for influ-
encing choices at earlier stages of contracting, such as promises, reliance, or precautions. I 
thank Professor Robert Scott for bringing this point to my attention. Email from Robert E. 
Scott, Alfred McCormack Professor of Law, Columbia Law Sch., to author (Aug. 24, 2016) 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, 
Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 Yale L.J. 1261, 1281–86 
(1980). 
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damages but also might substitute disgorgement if it deems the 
loss of business to Only Toys too hard to measure. Is Costmart 
more deterred from breaching than if it faced expectation 
damages for sure? 
Again, the same logic applies: Even if Costmart faces some chance of 
disgorging its profits, there is still a chance it will enjoy a net gain from 
breaching and paying expectation damages, so it will breach. Likewise, if 
the breach would hurt Only Toys more than it would benefit Costmart, 
then Costmart will not breach. 
These illustrations may come as a relief for those who favor harm-
internalizing incentives. Starting from a regime of purely harm-based 
damages, a shift toward the greater use of disgorgement among courts or 
enforcers can thus result in the same choices by the actor if the actor 
faces some uncertainty about whether the remedy in her individual case 
will be disgorgement or harm-based damages.51 
When complete deterrence is understood to be the law’s aim in-
stead, however, such choice equivalence may not be so welcome. 
Illustration—Breach of Trust. Frank Snepp, a former CIA an-
alyst, wrote a tell-all memoir about the fall of Saigon. The 
Supreme Court required him to disgorge his profits from the 
book—a remedy that the dissent condemned as “Draconian.”52 
In justification, the majority sounded the alarm of deterrence.53 
After all, Snepp had breached a nondisclosure agreement with 
the CIA, and disgorgement “is tailored to deter those who 
would place sensitive information at risk.”54 But the Court’s 
opinion also appears to hint that, had the harm to the 
government been more readily quantifiable, harm-based dam-
ages might have been appropriate.55 
                                                                                                                           
 51. This is, of course, a specific application of our general analysis to the category of 
harm-based damages. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (presenting the general 
analysis). In terms of the expressions presented above, set the primary remedy r equal to 
damages based on harm h :  That is, let r = h. 
 52. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 523 n.14 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(noting the majority’s “solicitude for Snepp’s welfare is rather ironic in view of the 
Draconian nature of the remedy imposed by the Court today”). 
 53. Id. at 515 (majority opinion) (“Since the remedy [of disgorgement] is swift and 
sure, it is tailored to deter those who would place sensitive information at risk.”); cf. id. at 
517 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court today grants the Government unprecedented 
and drastic relief in the form of a constructive trust over the profits derived by Snepp from 
the sale of the book.”). 
 54. Id. at 515 (majority opinion). Moreover, the Court suggested that his contract 
(and his former employment) with the CIA involved a fiduciary-like level of trust. Id. at 
510 (“Snepp’s employment with the CIA involved an extremely high degree of trust.”). To 
be precise, his breach was failing to submit the book to the CIA’s review process for pre-
publication clearance. Id. at 507–08. Arguably, a still more “tailored” remedy would have 
disgorged only his savings from not submitting the book for clearance. 
 55. Id. at 514 (“[T]he [circuit court’s] decision may well leave the Government with 
no reliable deterrent . . . . [T]he actual damages attributable to a publication such as 
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Let’s suppose that future whistleblowers read the opinion as suggest-
ing that harm-based damages, rather than disgorgement, might be 
awarded in some instances. The resulting incentives—of facing some 
chance of paying compensation instead of disgorgement—would serve 
optimal deterrence and thwart complete deterrence.56 
C. A Class of Regulatory Alternatives 
A fuller appreciation of choice equivalence may help to expand our 
regulatory imagination. This section presents two further ways of seeing 
how the probabilistic mixing of remedies defines a class of regulatory 
alternatives whose incentive effects can induce the same choices as full 
harm internalization. 
First, recall the classic reason for harm internalization: to make the 
actor take into account the harms she causes to others, just as she natu-
rally takes into account her own gains. (Think of a pollution tax, the ar-
chetypal example.) Internalizing both harms and gains serves optimal 
deterrence.57 So far, so familiar. 
Now, notice that the point is really to have the actor weigh those 
harms and gains in equal measure—but not necessarily in full measure. 
The potential polluter will make the efficient choice if she is weighing 
harms against gains, both at full value. But she will make the same choice 
if she is weighing them both at 2/3 of their true values.58 And she will 
also do so if she is weighing them both at only 1/2 of their true values. 
Any such combination is choice equivalent to any other. 
Full internalization, then, is just one of many choice-equivalent regu-
latory approaches. A more general class of approaches involves matching 
partial internalization with the same degree of partial self-interest. 
Leveling down an actor’s self-interest (by decreasing her prospective 
gains through some use of disgorgement) can complement our usual 
strategy of leveling up her concern for others’ harm (by increasing her 
prospective costs through some use of harm-based damages) as a way to 
serve optimal deterrence. 
Illustration—Chemical Spill. Suppose that the chemical com-
pany, Cyana, anticipates a 2/3 chance that the court will award 
compensatory damages and a 1/3 chance that the court will or-
                                                                                                                           
Snepp’s generally are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certain 
to deter no one. The punitive damages recoverable after a jury trial are speculative and 
unusual.”). 
 56. To be clear, optimal deterrence here would mean that these future whistleblow-
ers might end up either acting or not acting (depending on whether the anticipated gain 
outweighs the anticipated harm). What is being thwarted is the complete-deterrence guar-
antee that whistleblowers will never act. 
 57. See Sharkey, Punitive Damages, supra note 46, at 365 (explaining how the inter-
nalization of harm serves optimal deterrence). 
 58. In other words, g > h if and only if (2/3)g > (2/3)h. And so forth. 
1612 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 116:1595 
 
der disgorgement of its savings from not replacing the leaky car. 
This remedial mix dilutes Cyana’s self-serving motivations, be-
cause it is less sure to enjoy the savings. Meanwhile, it also raises 
Cyana’s internalization of harms, because it may have to pay 
harm-based damages. Because Cyana now weighs both its sav-
ings and the harms at 2/3 of their values, it makes the same 
choices as if it faced compensatory damages for sure. 
Another way of appreciating why such alternatives are choice equiva-
lent draws on an insight that contracts scholars have long noticed. As 
Professors Charles Goetz and Robert Scott put it, “In order to maintain 
the efficiency value of [a damages] rule, however, it is only necessary that 
some minimal amount of benefits are retained by the breacher in order 
to induce him not to perform.”59 In other words, any damages amount 
that falls between the promisee’s value and the promisor’s cost (but is 
not equal to the promisor’s cost) should serve efficient breach, just as 
standard expectation damages would. Professor Avery Katz has similarly 
suggested that “it may be optimal to split the difference” between expec-
tation damages and the promisor’s cost.60 To see the connection with the 
analysis above, we can interpret such intermediate values as naturally lev-
eling up and leveling down in just the right proportions.61 Likewise, we 
can interpret the probabilistic mixing of expectation damages with dis-
gorgement as setting expected damages for the breaching party some-
where in between the cost to the promisor and the value to the promisee. 
We can then extend the underlying intuition beyond the contracts 
context: For a given actor, if the gains from acting are greater than the 
harm, then any expected damages amount falling between the harm and 
the gains (but not equal to the gains) must be less than the gains. And so 
the actor’s ex ante incentive will be to act. But if the harm is greater than 
the gains, then any expected damages amount falling between the harm 
and the gains (but not equal to the gains) must be greater than the gains. 
And so the actor is deterred. These choices are equivalent to those the 
actor would make if he faced harm-based damages for sure.62 
                                                                                                                           
 59. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just 
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient 
Breach, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 554, 559 (1977). 
 60. Avery Katz, Reflections on Fuller and Perdue’s The Reliance Interest in Contract 
Damages :  A Positive Economic Framework, 21 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 541, 560 (1988). 
 61. I thank Professor Katz for pointing out to me that such an intermediate amount 
can be characterized as a linear combination of the value to the promisee and the cost to 
the promisor: Any fixed amount falling between the promisor’s cost c and the promisee’s 
value v can be written as the linear combination av + (1 - a)c. Thus the promisor will 
breach if av + (1 - a)c < c, which reduces to v < c. Email from Avery W. Katz, Vice Dean & 
Milton Handler Professor of Law, Columbia Law Sch., to author (Aug. 24, 2016) (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review). 
 62. Indeed, these choices are equivalent to those the actor would make if he faced 
any other expected damages amount falling between the harm and the gains (but not 
equal to the gains)—including, at one end of the spectrum, full harm internalization. 
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This intuition also readily applies to settlements. If the actor expects 
to settle in the shadow of a probabilistic mix of remedies, and thus antic-
ipates paying a settlement price equal to the expected value of that mix, 
such an expectation sets incentives that are choice equivalent to an ex-
pectation of settling at a price equal to compensation for harm. 
D. Ideal Conditions 
Noticing the possibility of choice equivalence is only step zero of the 
analysis. The accuracy of such emulation depends on certain ideal condi-
tions. In some contexts they will not be especially demanding. But reality 
will also often depart from the ideal, sometimes irretrievably. This section 
identifies three ideal conditions as well as the possible departures that 
may pose the greatest challenges. 
1. Use of the Primary Remedy. — The first ideal condition is that the 
gain-based remedy must not be used exclusively. This may seem a trivial 
condition because if no other remedy is involved, then there is no use for 
the equivalence concept. Yet there are subtle ways in which this condi-
tion may fail. For example, suppose that although the courts are mixing 
remedies as a general matter, the actor somehow knows ex ante that the 
particular court it will face will substitute disgorgement in this case.63 
This first condition then fails because disgorgement would be the only 
remedy relevant to the actor’s incentives. For remedial mixing to matter, 
the actor needs to face uncertainty ex ante about whether a future court 
will order disgorgement or the primary remedy in its case. 
Note what this condition does not say. It does not demand that the 
primary remedy be used much more often than the gain-based remedy. 
The actor must perceive some chance that the primary remedy will be 
used, but that is all. In theory, choice equivalence can occur even if the 
primary remedy is only ordered relatively rarely. 
Illustration—Chemical Spill. Recall that Cyana is deciding 
whether to replace a leaky train car carrying Chemical X. 
Suppose that it anticipates only a 1/5 chance that the courts will 
award compensatory damages and a 4/5 chance that the courts 
will order disgorgement. Its incentives are still choice equivalent 
to harm internalization alone. 
Cyana will thus make the same choice, whether it expects a 
1/5 chance of compensatory damages or a 2/3 chance (as in 
the earlier illustration). Notice that this also means it will make 
the same choice even if it miscalculates the chances (say, if the 
true chance is 2/3 but Cyana guesses 1/5). 
                                                                                                                           
 63. Another context in which this condition is likely to fail is when a private plaintiff 
is allowed to choose between remedies. See infra section III.D (describing consequences 
when the plaintiff can choose between the primary remedy and disgorgement). 
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Thus, in theory, the actor’s choice will not depend on how often the 
gain-based remedy will be used. Even if the primary remedy’s influence is 
greatly diluted, it will still point the actor in the right direction.64 
2. Accuracy of the Primary Remedy. — A second ideal condition be-
comes relevant if the actor is uncertain ex ante about the value of the 
primary remedy. In such a case, emulation requires that the actor antici-
pate that the expected value of the primary remedy, when it is awarded, 
reflects the primary remedy’s expected value were it always awarded. 
(This condition is obviously met when the primary remedy has only one 
possible value—for example, if there is a fixed fine, or if the actor knows 
ex ante the amount of damages that will be assessed.65) 
Illustration—Chemical Spill. Suppose Cyana does not know 
exactly how much harm will result from the spill, but knows the 
range of the possible extent of harm. Cyana also believes that 
courts tend to award compensatory damages when harm turns 
out to be at the higher end of the range, but tend to substitute 
disgorgement when harm turns out to be at the low end. Due to 
this perceived selection bias, Cyana’s incentives are choice 
equivalent to damages based on higher-than-average harm.66 
The result is that Cyana faces incentives that are more deterrent 
than those that would result were the courts always awarding compensa-
tory damages. In essence, the remedial mix in this case is emulating a 
biased sample from the range of potential compensatory damages, rather 
than a representative sample. How effectively courts or enforcers can 
make use of such substitution—or how readily they might fail—will often 
turn on this issue of selection bias.67 
Perfect emulation is not always a good thing, however. What if harm-
based damages are sometimes badly distorted—for instance, by gross 
mismeasurement or by doctrines that artificially limit recovery? As Part II 
will detail, a more strategic use of the equipoise effect may then be in 
                                                                                                                           
 64. This assumes that the other ideal conditions also hold. If not, then the relative 
usage of the primary remedy and of disgorgement can affect the degree of departures 
from exact choice equivalence, as described below. See infra section I.D.3 (discussing im-
pact of dilution when the actor has “leftover incentives” outside disgorgement’s reach); 
section III.C (analyzing distortionary effect of such leftover incentives and suggesting 
solutions). 
 65. For example, in the case of harm-based damages, this may occur if the actor 
knows the amount of harm her conduct will cause and expects harm-based damages to re-
flect that amount. It may also occur if the actor expects the remedy to be set equal to the 
expected value of the possible harms. (It will generally be assumed throughout this Essay 
that the actor knows her net gains from the conduct she is contemplating and thus the 
value of the disgorgement.).  
 66. By contrast, if Cyana knows the amount of harm its spill will cause, and thus it 
knows how much compensatory damages would be, then there is no issue of selection bias. 
 67. See infra section II.B.1 (examining the issue of selection bias in greater depth); 
infra section III.D (same). 
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order. Courts and public enforcers might instead co-opt the mechanism of 
selection bias, using it to counteract such distortions.68 
3. Accuracy in Erasing Gains. — The third condition may be called 
the “no leftover incentives” condition. The substitution of disgorgement 
dilutes two competing incentives in equal measure: the net gains from 
the act and the legal disincentives for the act due to the primary remedy. 
If these are the only incentives at work, then there is no problem. But if 
the actor has other incentives that fall outside the reach of disgorgement, 
then those incentives are not diluted. Instead, by comparison, they will 
loom large. 
What might such leftover incentives be? Most commonly, there may 
be costs of acting that are not offset in the disgorgement award.69 
Although disgorgement aims to remove only net gains—and thus implies 
offsetting of the actor’s costs—this offset may be imperfect. Some non-
economic costs might not be quantifiable. Or a court might omit oppor-
tunity costs or the cost of capital (though courts have recognized the 
need to offset both kinds of costs and have found ways to do so).70 To put 
it in more abstract terms, a court might fail to accurately assess the mar-
ginal net gain (or marginal net savings) relative to the actor’s best nonin-
fringing alternative course of action.71 
Moreover, an actor might also have favorable incentives that dis-
gorgement will not reach—for example, longer-term economic gains not 
yet evident or not provable to the court or enforcer.72 
 
                                                                                                                           
 68. See infra section II.C (explaining use by public enforcers); infra section II.D 
(explaining use by courts). 
 69. This sort of omission is sometimes a deliberate choice; courts or doctrines might 
overstate the profits to be disgorged. As Professor Mark Gergen has observed, “[C]ourts 
sometimes fudge the factual issue to award more than the likely gain attributable to the 
wrong in order to deter.” Mark P. Gergen, Causation in Disgorgement, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 
827, 830–31(2012). He further argues that “[t]he Restatement (Third) of Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment is less candid about this practice than it might be, perhaps because can-
dor weakens the claim in justice for what is described falsely as disgorgement in such 
cases.” Id.; see also infra note 133 and accompanying text (noting courts might purpose-
fully ignore leftover incentives as a way to increase the effective penalty). 
 70. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 
36 J.L. & Econ. 425, 442 (1993) (“Courts that award disgorgement of gain often temper 
that remedy by allowing the fiduciary a substantial reward for his entrepreneurial ef-
forts.”); Gergen, supra note 69, at 843 (“American courts are split on the question of 
whether a copyright or trademark infringer is allowed to deduct fixed costs or overhead in 
determining profits subject to disgorgement. . . . Causal analysis favors a deduction for 
fixed costs, for they represent opportunity costs.”). 
 71. Section III.C analyzes in more depth the effects on choice equivalence of such 
leftover costs, as well as litigation costs. 
 72. See, e.g., Dennis S. Corgill, Measuring the Gains of Trademark Infringement, 65 
Fordham L. Rev. 1909, 1914–15 (1997) (noting that “an infringer can benefit without 
earning profits during the period of knowing infringement”). 
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Illustration—Breach of Trust. Consider a case like that of the 
former CIA analyst, Frank Snepp.73 In calculating the profits 
that such an author must disgorge, a court might fail to offset 
the value of the time he spent writing the book, which could 
have been spent writing a different book. Or the court may be 
unable to account for the emotional impact of either criticism 
or acclaim for being a whistleblower.74 
The presence of such leftover incentives are, in a sense, an error in 
valuing the net gains to be disgorged, resulting in a failure to reach true 
equipoise in the first place. Such errors create distortions of a peculiar 
sort. The more the primary remedy is used relative to disgorgement in 
the remedial mix, the less the chance that these leftover incentives will 
make a difference in the actor’s decision.75 
This sliding-scale effect tempers a well-known peril of mismeasuring 
gains. As Professors Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell observed, one 
disadvantage of relying on a gain-based remedy alone for setting incen-
tives is that even a slight underestimation of the actor’s gains can result 
in a failure to deter acts whose harms greatly exceed their benefits, be-
cause a purely gain-based remedy does not force the actor to internalize 
any of the harm, no matter how large.76 But in the present context, harm-
based remedies are mixed with the gain-based remedies, and thus the 
chances of such a harsh consequence are diminished in two related ways. 
First, the influence of an error in measuring gains is reduced because the 
actor does not expect disgorgement to be used all the time. Second, in 
this mixed scheme, actors do internalize harm (if only partially) and 
therefore cannot entirely ignore the possibility of causing great harm.77 
E. Information Demands 
At this point, it may seem that information costs must be quite high 
for the effective use of choice equivalence. Undoubtedly, in some con-
texts, such an approach will be infeasible or wasteful due to information 
costs. Most obviously, good information about the right amount of gains 
                                                                                                                           
 73. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text (describing the Snepp case). 
 74. Section III.A offers further illustrations of both hidden costs and hidden benefits. 
 75. Sections III.B and III.C contain examples and further analysis of the effect of 
leftover costs on choice equivalence. 
 76. Polinsky & Shavell, Harm or Gain, supra note 11, at 430–34. 
 77. Both the reduction in influence of disgorgement errors and the degree of 
internalization of harm will vary with the extent to which the remedial mix uses harm-
based damages rather than disgorgement. The same reasoning applies to a further con-
cern raised by Professors Polinsky and Shavell, that overestimating gain-based damages will 
deter actors even when gains greatly exceed harm. Id. This concern is diminished in the 
present context for essentially the same reasons: First, facing a remedial mix, the actor 
does not expect disgorgement to be used all the time; and second, whether gains outweigh 
harm does matter to the actor’s choice. 
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to be disgorged may be unavailable. But without minimizing such con-
cerns, a few favorable points should be noted. 
1. What Is Not Required. — First, recall that the actor does not need to 
know exactly how often one remedy will be substituted for the other, be-
cause whatever mix she imagines will still induce the right choice (if 
choice equivalence holds).78 Conveniently, this also means that courts 
and public enforcers need not guess what exact probabilistic mix the ac-
tor might be expecting; nor do they need to convey the exact probabili-
ties to the actor. What the actor needs to perceive (and all that courts or 
enforcers need to convey), in theory, is uncertainty about whether the 
remedy in a specific case will be disgorgement or the primary remedy.79 
Second, choice equivalence does not require calculating both harm-
based damages and gain-based damages in a given case. Indeed, it allows 
the substitution of gain-based damages when harm is hard to measure, as 
Part II will detail.80 And when harm-based damages are awarded, there is 
no need to calculate gains.  
2. Negligence or Strict Liability? — One favorable quality of choice 
equivalence may be useful to consider in deciding between a negligence 
regime and a strict liability regime. The relative merits of these regimes 
have been studied in an extensive literature raising many complications 
that cannot be fully considered here,81 but it may still be worth noting a 
fairly basic way for choice equivalence to enter into the calculus. 
Illustration—Chemical Spill. Judge Richards is deciding 
whether Cyana’s chemical spill should be treated under negli-
gence or strict liability, a question of first impression. She rec-
ognizes that in some such cases the full extent of harm may 
quickly become evident, while in other cases harm will be un-
derestimated because future harm is unknown or not provable. 
How should this potential for errors in measurement affect her 
decision? 
If the negligence test depends on information about harm, as the 
Hand formula does,82 Judge Richards may sensibly decide that the law 
                                                                                                                           
 78. To borrow from an earlier example in section I.D.1, choice equivalence is possi-
ble even if the actor thinks that the chances of paying compensation rather than dis-
gorgement are 1/5, say, while the actual chances are 2/3. 
 79. To be clear, the term “uncertainty” here means that the actor perceives some 
(nonzero) probability of paying the primary remedy and some probability of paying dis-
gorgement. This Essay brackets the problem of radical uncertainty in the Knightian sense. 
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1719, 1726 
(2004) (“The problem is that uncertainty does not allow for this thinking in terms of 
averages because we do not know what is supposed to be averaged.”). 
 80. See infra section II.B (explaining such a strategy of substitution). 
 81. For a survey of this literature and its principal insights, including various dimen-
sions of complications, see generally Steven Shavell, Foundations of the Economic Analysis 
of Law 174–256 (2004) [hereinafter Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law]. 
 82. Judge Learned Hand’s version of the negligence test famously requires a weigh-
ing of expected harm against the cost of precautions. See United States v. Carroll Towing 
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should favor a strict liability regime in which compensatory damages are 
awarded only when they can be reliably measured, while disgorgement is 
substituted otherwise. (As we have seen, this approach is choice equiva-
lent to a regime of reliably measured compensatory damages.) The dis-
advantage of using a negligence test that relies on harm assessment, in 
contexts where harm is often hard to measure, is that doing so risks in-
troducing errors at both the liability and the remedies stages.83 By avoid-
ing distortions at both stages, a strict liability regime with strategic 
substitution may well better serve the aim of harm internalization. 
If, however, the negligence test is based on a different method for 
setting the standard of care that does not involve assessing harms, then a 
strict liability regime with strategic substitution may have less of an in-
formational advantage, or may even have a disadvantage. At the liability 
stage, of course, such a negligence test still demands more information 
than strict liability.84 But at the remedies stage, the presence of a negli-
gence test might relieve some need for accuracy in setting the level of 
damages.85 Then again, it might not,86 in which case the informational 
                                                                                                                           
Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (“[I]f the probability be called P; the injury, L; and 
the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., 
whether B > PL.”). 
 83. To be clear, these may be distinct errors, although both are affected by the diffi-
culty of measuring harm: At the liability stage, the proper use of the Hand formula, supra 
note 82, presumably would involve assessing the possible harms (and their likelihoods) 
that should reasonably have been foreseen by the actor ex ante, while at the remedies 
stage, what is being measured for compensation purposes is the realized harm. 
 84. The information costs occur both in setting the standard of care and in assessing 
whether the actor met that standard, as a factual matter. See, e.g., Shavell, Economic 
Analysis of Law, supra note 81, at 181 (“Under strict liability a court need only determine 
the magnitude of the loss that occurred, whereas under the negligence rule a court must 
in addition determine the level of care actually taken (a driver’s speed) and calculate the 
socially optimal level of due care (the appropriately safe speed).”). 
 85. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Liability for Accidents, in 1 Handbook of Law and 
Economics 140, 165 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (“Under the negli-
gence rule . . . on one hand, damages can be somewhat less than harm and optimal care 
will still be induced; on the other hand, damages can exceed harm and optimal care will 
be induced.”). The familiar reason is that there is a discrete jump in legal disincentives, 
jumping from zero to the damages amount, between actions on the safe side of the liability 
threshold and those on the liable side. See id. (explaining discontinuity); Robert Cooter, 
Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1523, 1523–24 (1984) (explaining “[i]f lawmakers 
can identify socially desirable behavior, but are prone to error in assessing the cost of devi-
ations from it, then sanctions [which a negligence standard creates] are preferable to 
prices [which strict liability creates]” because “[a] sanction typically creates an abrupt 
jump in an individual’s cost” when applied). 
 86. Professors Mark Grady and Marcel Kahan have observed that one reason a negli-
gence regime may not necessarily mitigate the need for accuracy in setting damages levels 
is that the incentives discontinuity at the negligence threshold might be smoothed out by 
other properties of the legal regime. See, e.g. Jennifer Arlen, Torts Damages, in 2 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 682, 685 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest 
eds., 2000) (noting the insight that “if the application of ‘but for’ causation effectively 
eliminates the discontinuity in the injurer’s expected liability function . . . injurers will not 
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advantage goes more clearly to a strict liability regime with strategic 
substitution. 
II. USING EQUIVALENCE 
The logic of choice equivalence points to a tantalizing “worry-free” 
possibility: Courts or public enforcers may be able to substitute dis-
gorgement for other damages or sanctions, on occasion, without needing 
to worry about throwing off future actors’ ex ante choices. This Part fo-
cuses on one application of this remedial flexibility—as a way to work 
around problems of measurement in awarding harm-based remedies 
such as compensatory or expectation damages. The following analysis will 
also suggest why using a probabilistic mix of harm-based and gain-based 
damages might even serve the aims of harm internalization better, in 
some circumstances, than using solely harm-based damages.87 
Before proceeding, let us make a mental note of two limitations. 
First, the actor’s gains may also be hard to measure in some contexts.88 
For clarity’s sake, the exposition here will assume that accurate meas-
urement of the marginal net gains or marginal net savings to be dis-
gorged is feasible—but of course that is not always so. 
Second, substitution plainly sacrifices the aim of accurate compensa-
tion for those injured parties who do end up with a disgorgement award. 
Some such parties might recover more than the harm they suffered, and 
some might recover less. A substitution strategy may thus be more attrac-
tive to a public enforcer who is not bound to seek compensation for 
harm. It may be less appealing for contexts, including private disputes, in 
which accurate case-by-case compensation may be valued for reasons  
  
                                                                                                                           
take due care unless damages fully compensate victims” (citing Mark Grady, A New 
Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 Yale L.J. 799 (1983); Marcel Kahan, 
Causation and Incentives to Take Care Under the Negligence Rule, 18 J. Legal Stud. 427 
(1989))). 
 87. In brief: By strategically substituting disgorgement, a court or enforcer can omit 
harm-based awards that suffer from artificial distortions, so that the remedial mix emulates 
the incentive effect of the set of only the remaining harm-based awards, which more accu-
rately reflect true harm. More precisely, because we are focusing on the actor’s ex ante 
incentives, what is important is that the actor perceives that distorted harm-based damages 
awards will be omitted. As section I.D emphasizes, however, this actor must face at least 
some uncertainty about whether the act he is contemplating will in fact lead to such a 
distorted damages award and thus trigger substitution, or whether instead the court will be 
able to assess accurate harm-based damages. 
 88. For example, in the Kansas–Nebraska water dispute, Nebraska’s gain from the ad-
ditional water was difficult to estimate, with figures ranging from at least $25 million to as 
much as $61 million. Report of the Special Master at 172, 177, Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. 
Ct. 1042 (2015) (No. 126). 
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other than deterrence.89 This limitation may make the substitution 
strategy unpalatable in some contexts.90 
A. The Problems of Measuring Harm 
At times it can be fiendishly hard to award accurate damages based 
on harm. Think of inchoate harms or future harms. And then there are 
subjective or idiosyncratic harms, including some emotional harms. Even 
some economic harms, such as lost profits or market prices when no 
market exists, may call for sophisticated guesses. 
The usual common law approaches to such measurement problems 
range from tolerating guesswork to awarding nothing at all. If a court 
decides that the amount of damages cannot be shown with “reasonable 
certainty,” then the award may end up being zero—even when the harms 
are very real.91 This constraint operates in both the contracts and torts 
contexts.92 
To take a textbook example, in Freund v. Washington Square Press, the 
high court of New York determined that a playwright could not recover 
lost royalties from his publisher who breached by refusing to publish his 
book, because the value of those royalties, “while theoretically compen-
sable, was speculative.”93 Freund’s lost royalties were a future harm and 
so he was able to provide “no stable foundation for a reasonable estimate 
of royalties he would have earned had defendant not breached its prom-
ise to publish.”94 He therefore recovered only nominal damages. 
                                                                                                                           
 89. When a court might normally decline to award harm-based damages for being 
too speculative or conjectural, however, the substitution of disgorgement would allow 
plaintiffs to recover something rather than nothing. (Indeed, it may well allow the plaintiff 
to recover more than the amount of harm.) 
 90. As this Essay focuses on introducing a theoretical analysis of the incentive-emula-
tion implications of the equipoise effect, it will bracket important questions of how and 
when due process limitations might bar the sort of substitution strategies explored here 
(and whether they should). 
 91. See, e.g., Hermalin, Katz & Craswell, supra note 12, § 5.3.1 (noting that “in prac-
tice, a number of legal doctrines limit the losses that expectation damages will compen-
sate,” including the “reasonable certainty” requirement, which “often . . . will exclude 
recovery of ‘speculative’ losses whose amount was uncertain”); Napolitano & Luneau, 
supra note 24 (collecting recent New York cases barring “speculative” or “conjectural” 
damages in both the contracts and torts contexts); cf. Paul V. Niemeyer, Awards for Pain 
and Suffering: The Irrational Centerpiece of Our Tort System, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1401, 1402, 
1414–17 (2004) (noting that “[p]ain is real, and, of course the suffering it causes is real” 
and that “pain and suffering are part of any genuine personal injury caused by a tort” but 
advocating for statutory restrictions and limitations on pain-and-suffering damages). 
 92. See, e.g., Napolitano & Luneau, supra note 24. 
 93. 314 N.E.2d 419, 421 (N.Y. 1974). I thank Professor Scott for reminding me that 
Freund’s book advance can be seen as a form of liquidated damages (because he did not 
have to refund it). Email from Robert E. Scott to author, supra note 50. 
 94. Freund, 314 N.E.2d at 421. 
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B. A Substitution Strategy 
These travails suggest a reason for courts or public enforcers to 
make use of choice equivalence by substituting disgorgement when 
harm-based damages are difficult to measure or would be distorted rela-
tive to the true extent of harm.95 In some contexts, courts have already 
experimented with substituting gain-based damages when harms are 
hard to prove or calculate; they have usually done so when the measure 
of an actor’s gains can plausibly serve as a proxy measure for the plain-
tiff’s harm.96 But we can do better than that. The strategy of substitution 
suggested here is enabled by the equipoise effect; it does not rely on any 
closeness in value between gains and harms. Thus, its use is not confined 
to such cases. Gains and harms often differ greatly in value and cannot 
be justified as proxies for one another. Yet if choice equivalence is possi-
ble, substitution may nonetheless serve the aims of harm internalization. 
Illustration—Noncompete Agreements. Layton signed a non-
compete agreement with his former employer Adz, a company 
selling advertisements in study guides it gives away to law stu-
dents. Layton then formed his own company copying the Adz 
business model anyway. Finding Layton liable for breach, a 
court might estimate harm-based damages based on the value of 
the new company’s profits, as an approximation, on the theory 
that Adz could have earned as much.97 Yet even if the new com-
pany was actually far more (or far less) profitable than Adz, 
gain-based damages can still be useful as part of a substitution 
strategy if the conditions for choice equivalence can be met. 
In fact, when the shortcomings of harm-based damages are severe, a 
substitution strategy might not only be serviceable for inducing a harm-
internalizing effect, but also superior. The reason is that it may be better 
to emulate more accurate incentives by using a strategy of substitution, 
than to create distorted incentives by relying directly on biased harm-
based damages. 
Illustration—Patent Damages. A patent-holding company, 
Luce, owns the patent for a one-click interface feature that is 
used in a variety of software.98 Suppose that M-Soft is found to 
                                                                                                                           
 95. This approach is a workaround, and more direct solutions for improving the 
accuracy of damages may be possible; however, the structural errors that have character-
ized some attempts at more direct reform should not leave us with much optimism on that 
front. See, e.g., Huang, supra note 8, at 722–26, 730–31 (detailing failings of typical statu-
tory damages schemes intended to aid recovery for harms that are hard to establish). 
 96. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105 
Mich. L. Rev. 559, 587–88 (2006) (describing the use of disgorgement as a “surrogate” for 
expectation damages when the latter is hard to calculate). 
 97. This illustration is loosely based on National Merchant Corp. v. Leyden, 348 
N.E.2d 771, 774–75 (Mass. 1976) (Kaplan, J.) (affirming an award of restitutionary dis-
gorgement). 
 98. To be clear, let us assume that Luce is a patent-holding company that is a non-
practicing entity; thus, a reasonable royalty is the proper harm-based measure of damages. 
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have infringed on Luce’s patent based on a similar feature 
found in M-Soft’s personal calendar software.99 Setting 
compensatory damages based on a reasonable royalty may re-
quire the court to estimate the licensing price that the parties 
would have agreed to before the infringing use occurred. This 
task is fraught with guesswork at each step. 
In the face of such uncertainty, courts have sometimes resorted to 
arbitrary fictions, much to the consternation of scholars and practition-
ers.100 If choice equivalence holds, however, a substitution strategy be-
comes a possible alternative; courts can replace such fictional awards with 
disgorgement, while continuing to order the standard remedy when it is 
more readily assessed with accuracy. 
Several principles should guide courts and enforcers when applying 
such substitution strategies. These guidelines, which correspond to the 
ideal conditions for choice equivalence articulated in Part I, can be or-
ganized into two categories: Those that relate to the problems of accu-
racy in representing true harm, and those that relate to the problems of 
accuracy in erasing gains. 
1. Guidelines as to Harm. — Recall that in situations where the actor 
does not know how much harm the contemplated act will cause, it is im-
portant to avoid conveying a perception of selection bias in the substitu-
tion strategy. This corresponds to the second ideal condition described 
above, that substitution occur in such a way that the actor will perceive 
that the expected value of the primary remedy when it is used reflects the 
primary remedy’s expected value were it used all the time.101 In the pre-
sent application, however, we are considering the complication that the 
primary remedy itself might be inaccurate or distorted. As a result, the 
proper aim is a modified principle: Substitution should be used in such a 
way that the expected value of the harm-based damages when they are 
awarded reflects the act’s true average harm. 
                                                                                                                           
See, e.g., Peter S. Menell et al., Patent Case Management Judicial Guide § 7.3.4.7, at 7-14 
(2009) (discussing the application of the reasonable royalty measure in cases of non-
manufacturing entities). 
 99. This illustration is loosely based on Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 
580 F.3d 1301, 1308–09 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (vacating a reasonable royalty award as unsup-
ported by evidence). 
 100. One infamous fiction was presuming a 25% royalty rate; the Federal Circuit only 
(mostly) abandoned this fiction after many years of use. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft 
Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (rejecting the “twenty-five-percent rule”). But 
see Energy Transp. Grp. v. William Demant Holding A/S, 697 F.3d 1342, 1356–57 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012) (allowing the limited use of the 25% rule as one factor in determining the rate). 
A somewhat more persistent fiction is the so-called “Entire Market Value Rule.” See 
Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profit, supra note 15, at 663–64 (lamenting distortive fictions 
such as the Entire Market Value Rule, which applies a royalty rate to the full market 
revenues of the infringing product even though the infringed patent accounts for only a 
part of the product’s value). 
 101. See supra section I.D.2 (describing the need for such representativeness). 
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In considering how this principle might be implemented, it is useful 
to consider two types of situations: (1) when harm-based damages are 
generally accurate on average, though sometimes hard to prove, and (2) 
when harm-based damages are likely to be biased—that is, distorted rela-
tive to true harm. 
If the actor faces uncertainty about the extent of harm her act will 
cause and harm-based damages are generally accurate on average, then 
the court or public enforcer should substitute disgorgement in such a 
way that the actor will not expect the chances of substitution to correlate 
with the extent of the realized harm. 
Illustration—Patent Damages. Consider again the patent dis-
pute between Luce and M-Soft. Imagine now that M-Soft has 
not yet infringed, but is contemplating doing so. It is uncertain 
how many infringing units it can sell. It does know that in in-
fringement litigation, the reasonable royalty may be hard for a 
court to determine. It expects that some courts will substitute 
disgorgement when faced with such a difficulty, while the re-
maining courts will award royalty rates that are correct on aver-
age.102 If M-Soft estimates the chances that the court in its case 
will substitute disgorgement to be 1/3, no matter how many 
units of the software have been sold, then choice equivalence is 
possible. But choice equivalence fails if M-Soft expects courts to 
be more likely to use substitution if it has sold, say, 1,000 units 
than if it has sold 1,000,000 units.103 
Note that this does not require the court or public enforcer to 
choose between the remedies randomly or haphazardly. What is im-
portant is that the actor does not perceive ex ante that the courts’ criteria 
for substitution will be correlated with the realized harm. For obvious 
reasons, it may be quite difficult for a court or a public enforcer to ac-
tively impress upon future actors that it is following such a guideline. It 
may be more plausible for the nature of uncertainty on the actor’s part 
to satisfy this independence condition. 
In the second type of situation, in which actors face uncertainty 
about the extent of harm, and harm-based damages may be artificially 
distorted relative to the realized harm, courts or enforcers can use selec-
tion bias to counteract such potential distortions. For instance, they can 
substitute disgorgement instead of awarding the distorted harm-based 
awards. Again it is essential for the actor to perceive no correlation be-
tween the extent of realized harm and the likelihood of substitution, 
                                                                                                                           
 102. The right amount of profits to disgorge may also be hard to calculate, of course, 
such as when apportionment of the patent’s contribution to the software’s value is difficult. 
 103. This illustration assumes that M-Soft knows the true royalty rate. To offer a varia-
tion in which M-Soft faces uncertainty about the true royalty rate: If M-Soft estimates that 
the chance a court will substitute disgorgement is 1/3, regardless of whether the accurate 
royalty rate turns out to be $100 or $500, then choice equivalence is possible. But choice 
equivalence fails if M-Soft expects courts to be less (or more) likely to do the substitution 
when the royalty rate is $100. 
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even while the actor understands that disgorgement will replace the dis-
torted harm-based damages. For example, in the M-Soft illustration, the 
approach may work if M-Soft understands that courts will substitute dis-
gorgement whenever the calculation of reasonable royalties would be 
distorted by the application of pricing fictions, but also that the chances 
of such distortions (and hence the chances of substitution) turn on fac-
tors unrelated to the number of units sold.104 
2. Guidelines as to Gains. — Next, recall the ideal condition that the 
court or enforcer should aim as closely as possible for true equipoise 
when assessing the disgorgement award.105 That is, it should be sure to 
remove the actor’s net gains as accurately and fully as possible—includ-
ing offsetting the actor’s full range of costs. This is what we have called 
the “no leftover incentives” condition. 
Notably, the very fact of substitution amplifies the problem that de-
partures from this condition create for choice equivalence: Because sub-
stitution dilutes the influence of harm-based damages, such extraneous 
costs (as well as any leftover favorable motives) will loom larger—and may 
at times overwhelm the remaining influence of the diluted incentives. 
Meeting the “no leftover incentives” condition may be difficult or 
infeasible when some of the actor’s costs or raw gains are intangible, idi-
osyncratic, or not yet apparent because they will accrue in the future.106 
Opportunity costs may also be hard to measure, even if courts are famil-
iar with the need to account for them.107 Part III will elaborate on 
particular difficulties with some such costs and touch on potential 
solutions. 
C. Public and Private Enforcement 
The substitution strategy may be both more feasible and more at-
tractive in public enforcement actions than in private disputes. Certain 
public enforcers may have leeway to seek penalties based on gains in lieu 
of penalties based on harm. Unlike a court with private plaintiffs before 
it and a specific harm to remedy, such a public enforcer may have no 
                                                                                                                           
 104. As before, this version of the scenario assumes that M-Soft knows ex ante the true 
royalty rate (but not how many units it will sell). To extend the alternative version, in 
which M-Soft does not know the royalty rate: If M-Soft estimates that the chance a court 
will substitute disgorgement is 1/3, regardless of whether the accurate royalty rate turns 
out to be $100 or $500, then the approach may work. But the approach fails if M-Soft ex-
pects distortion (due to the pricing fiction), and hence the substitution of disgorgement, 
to be less (or more) likely when the royalty rate is $100. 
 105. See supra section I.D.3 (explaining the third ideal condition). 
 106. It is worth re-emphasizing here that assessing net gains entails information costs, 
just as quantifying harm does. 
 107. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 69, at 846–47 (noting that if “disgorgement gener-
ally is limited to the gain attributable to a wrong” then “overhead, fixed costs, and oppor-
tunity costs” should be offset “if their value can be determined with a fair degree of 
certainty”). 
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strong reason to tie penalties to harm except to set a desired level of de-
terrence.108 And as we have seen, a substitution strategy may serve just as 
well, or better, for optimal deterrence. 
1. Imperfect Private Enforcement. — Public enforcers may be able to 
use choice equivalence to fill gaps in deterrence left by incomplete pri-
vate enforcement, especially in cases with multiple victims.109 For exam-
ple, suppose that an act has affected a large group of consumers, and the 
public enforcer estimates that the harm-based damages being pursued by 
private plaintiffs will likely only cover a certain proportion (say 1/10) of 
the total harm. Rather than pursuing supplemental sanctions based on 
the harms suffered by the absent victims, the public enforcer may instead 
peg its sanctions to 9/10 of the actor’s gains.110 As explained above, this 
combination of private damages worth 1/10 of the harms and public 
sanctions worth 9/10 of the gains can emulate the incentive effect of a 
set of penalties worth the full amount of harm.111 
Illustration—Food Safety. Suppose an agricultural produce 
company sells spinach. For one full year, the company neglects 
to inspect the spinach for bacteria before sending it to market. 
The FDA estimates that one hundred people became seriously 
ill due to consuming the company’s spinach that year. Only ten 
of those victims file suit, and they reach confidential settle-
                                                                                                                           
 108. It should be noted that some public enforcers do use the fines or penalties they 
collect from wrongdoers to create compensation funds for victims. See SEC v. Cavanagh, 
445 F.3d 105, 117 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Upon awarding disgorgement, a district court may 
exercise its discretion to direct the money toward victim compensation or to the United 
States Treasury.”); Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence 
from the SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 331, 332–34 (2015) (“Since 2002, 
the SEC has deposited $14.46 billion for defrauded investors into 243 distribution funds, 
usually called ‘fair funds’ after the statute that authorizes them.”); see also FTC v. 
Cephalon, Inc., No. 08-cv-2141, at 4 (E.D. Pa. May 28, 2015) (statement of the Commission), 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/645491/150528cephalon
statement.pdf [http://perma.cc/J25L-USZR] (“The proposed order requires Cephalon to pay 
$1.2 billion into a settlement fund that will provide redress to purchasers who overpaid for Provigil 
as a result of Cephalon’s illegal conduct.”); Cardinal Health, Inc., FTC File No. 101-0006, at 2 
(F.T.C. Apr. 17, 2015) (statement of the Commission), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ 
documents/public_statements/637781/150420cardinalhealthcommstmt.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
K247-2ZDK] (explaining that the settlement “requires [Cardinal] to disgorge its ill-gotten 
gains by paying $26.8 million into a fund that will be used to compensate affected 
customers”). 
 109. For an argument similar in spirit, see Elhauge, supra note 2, at 84 (“[T]his trend 
[of limiting the availability of antitrust class actions] supports having our antitrust agencies 
take up the slack left by the increasing barriers to antitrust class actions by bringing more 
disgorgement suits.”). 
 110. Cf. Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable Remedies in Competition Cases, 68 
Fed. Reg. 45,820, 45,822 (Aug. 4, 2003) (“[W]hen practical or legal difficulties are likely to 
preclude compensation for those injured by a violation who in equity should be made 
whole, we may seek restitution for them.”). 
 111. See supra section I.C (noting that the approach of matching partial internaliza-
tion to partial self-interest emulates the incentive effect of full internalization). 
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ments. In setting regulatory sanctions against the company, the 
FDA aims to make up the gap in harm-internalizing incentives. 
The direct way to do so is to assess penalties that capture the 
harm suffered by the ninety missing victims. But if the agency 
does not have reliable measures of harm, it can nonetheless 
achieve choice-equivalent incentives by fining the company an 
amount based on 90% of the company’s net gains (that is, its 
savings from neglecting inspections during that year).112 
Likewise, if the public enforcer is solely responsible for setting deter-
rence for the actor, then it may choose to apply sanctions that combine a 
harm-based measure (covering the known victims) with a gain-based 
measure for the remaining share. 
Illustration—Food Safety. In the case of the bad spinach, 
suppose that none of the one hundred victims comes forth to 
seek compensation. The FDA is able to identify only ten specific 
victims to evaluate their actual harms. The agency might then 
set purely harm-based penalties by extrapolating from these 
known harms. Or instead, the agency could set choice-equiva-
lent incentives by assessing penalties equal to those known 
harms (representing 10% of total harm) plus 90% of the 
company’s net gains.113 
The use of such fractional disgorgement is not inconceivable, espe-
cially in negotiated agreements such as consent decrees.114 Even courts 
may be willing to use their equitable powers to award combination reme-
dies that are partly based on harms and partly on gains. As the Supreme 
Court noted in the recent interstate water dispute, “disgorgement need 
not be all or nothing.”115 The majority further explained that “if partial 
disgorgement will serve to stabilize a compact by conveying an effective 
message to the breaching party that it must work hard to meet its future 
obligations, then the Court has discretion to order only that much.”116 
                                                                                                                           
 112. As emphasized in sections I.D.2 and II.B.1, a key assumption here is that actors 
perceive that the average harm among the victims who sued is representative of the 
average harm among all victims. 
 113. This latter combination again results in total penalties worth 1/10 of the harm 
plus 9/10 of the gain, which is choice equivalent to total penalties worth the full amount 
of harm (again, assuming that the average harm among the ten identified victims is 
representative). 
 114. Although fractional remedies may seem artificial, they have appeared in some 
federal enforcement actions and moreover, have been approved by the courts. See, e.g., 
United States v. Morgan Stanley, 881 F. Supp. 2d 563, 567–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (approving 
22% disgorgement in an antitrust consent decree); United States v. Keyspan Corp., 763 F. 
Supp. 2d 633, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (approving 25% disgorgement in a related case). 
 115. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1058 (2015). 
 116. Id. 
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Indeed, the Court ordered partial disgorgement in addition to a con-
ceded award of full compensation.117 
2. Imperfect Public Enforcement. — Suppose now that violators face 
only a 1/3 chance of being detected and sanctioned. Thus, they expect 
to pay for the harm done only 1/3 of the time. The usual multiplier solu-
tion is to assign total damages (in cases when the violation is detected) 
that are worth three times the amount of harm. For example, if the vic-
tims themselves collect full compensation, then a public enforcer may 
step in with supplemental sanctions that are double the compensation.118 
Again, substitution is possible: Instead of supplementing the com-
pensatory award with a further harm-based penalty, the public enforcer 
may seek a gain-based penalty—in this case, double disgorgement instead 
of double compensation. These combinations are choice equivalent; 
both generate optimal deterrence. 
Illustration—Food Safety. Consider again the case of the bad 
spinach. Suppose all one hundred injured victims sue for com-
pensation. Yet the FDA also knows from experience that in simi-
lar cases, the originating source of tainted produce is discovered 
only 1/3 of the time and thus, only 1/3 of such incidents will 
result in compensation. The agency might make up for the de-
terrence gap by assessing further penalties amounting to twice 
the compensation that is won. But a choice-equivalent approach 
is to set penalties equal to twice the company’s net gains 
instead. 
The reason is familiar by now, even if the configuration of remedies 
is slightly different: Agricultural producers know they will face a 1/3 
chance of paying double disgorgement—an expected penalty of 2/3 of 
gains—along with the existing 1/3 chance of paying compensatory 
damages. 
Thus, a public enforcer wishing to apply supplemental sanctions can 
choose to seek either compensation or disgorgement as the basis for 
such sanctions, achieving the same deterrent effect either way.119 And it is 
                                                                                                                           
 117. Id. at 1051 (describing the Special Master’s recommended award as $3.7 million 
for loss as well as “another $1.8 million in partial disgorgement”). 
 118. The usual multiplier approach becomes much more complicated when the likeli-
hood of sanction is correlated with the extent of harm. See Craswell, Deterrence and 
Damages, supra note 31, at 2193–98 (illustrating complications undermining the conven-
tional multiplier principle, such as when the probability of sanction is correlated with the 
magnitude of harm). Such complexities are bracketed here. 
 119. In theory, punitive damages may also be used this way if the act being punished is 
one that the law treats as a case for optimal deterrence rather than complete deterrence 
(though whether that is actually a null set is a debatable question). To elaborate: A court 
seeking to use punitive damages to make up for the deterrence gap that occurs (say, if 
only 1/3 of plaintiffs come forward to seek compensation) might normally calculate puni-
tive damages by applying a multiplier to compensatory damages (in this case, ordering 
punitive damages that are worth double the compensation, in order to reach a total dam-
ages award of triple compensation). But choice equivalence allows the court to emulate 
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not hard to imagine that a public enforcer might be better able to estab-
lish the amount of the actor’s gains than the victims’ harms,120 or that the 
agency may prefer one or the other approach for institutional reasons. 
3. Omitting Outliers. — Public enforcers may also be more likely to 
have the informational resources needed to use substitution more strate-
gically for replacing outlier harm-based awards. If a particular enforce-
ment action may result in harm-based penalties that are unusually low or 
high (for idiosyncratic reasons), the enforcer may choose instead to sub-
stitute disgorgement in that case. This can avoid creating a misimpres-
sion for future actors about the typical harm that such conduct might 
entail or about the harm-based penalties that might follow. 
Illustration—Oil Spill. EP operates oil rigs in the Gulf of 
Mexico. While attempting to drill a new well, EP causes an oil 
spill.121 An investigation finds that EP’s failure to perform a 
number of customary safety checks, despite warning signs of 
abnormal pressure in the well, caused the spill. Any of these er-
rors alone would have been enough to cause the spill. Yet due 
to fortuitous and unusual seismic conditions unknown to EP at 
the time, the well sealed itself off without further intervention. 
As a result, the amount of oil released into the water was mini-
mal—but only due to a quirk of fate. 
In such an outlier case, the public enforcer may prefer to seek dis-
gorgement of EP’s savings from underperforming its safety checks (or 
penalties reflecting that amount) rather than harm-based penalties. This 
will allow other cases, in which harm-based penalties reflect more typical 
levels of harm, to set the deterrence for future actors.122 
D. Judicial Gatekeeping 
A principal limitation of substitution remains that it may be unap-
pealing in contexts where compensation is valued for reasons other than 
deterrence. The uses of substitution discussed in this Part, however, have 
focused on contexts where the aim of accurate compensation is already 
                                                                                                                           
the incentive effect of that approach by instead assigning punitive damages that are worth 
double disgorgement. 
 120. For example, if the individual victims sued but settled confidentially, the FDA 
may not have good information about their actual harms. 
 121. This illustration is loosely adapted from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. See In re 
Oil Spill by Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” 21 F. Supp. 3d 657, 747–48 (E.D. La. 2014) 
(discussing the cause of the oil spill). 
 122. It would be sensible to argue that the chance of an actor getting extremely lucky 
should be included in average harm (just as any other state of the world should be in-
cluded). But the suggestion here is that the public enforcer would also omit outliers at the 
other extreme, at the unlucky end of the spectrum of potential realizations of harm; the 
overall strategy is to omit outliers from both tails of the distribution. (Alternatively, the 
enforcer can argue that its aim is to induce future actors not to take gambles hoping that 
such freakish luck is possible, even if it is; but then, the public enforcer would be 
engineering a slight distortion in incentives.) 
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compromised. It may thus be worth considering whether some of the 
judicial tools currently used to address such situations might be adapted 
to allow the use of substitution. This section briefly explores two such 
possibilities. 
1. The “Inadequate Remedy at Law” Criterion. — Common law courts 
play a gatekeeping role in the use of equitable remedies, such as injunc-
tive relief or specific performance, and there is already some degree of 
acceptance of disgorgement as a further equitable option. It sometimes 
serves as a monetary substitute for injunctive relief, most familiarly as a 
substitute for specific performance in the contracts context.123 
The traditional “inadequate remedy at law” criterion for equitable 
relief may thus be worth considering as a possible opening for the use of 
strategic substitution.124 When compensatory or expectation damages are 
likely to fail to capture the full extent of harm, substitution can be useful 
for reducing underdeterrence. The problem is that this criterion would 
only seem available for use when harm-based damages would otherwise 
be too low, not too high,125 unless courts are willing to read “inadequacy” 
broadly to include situations where damages are likely to be mismeas-
ured in either direction.126 It may also seem dissonant to use a criterion 
focused on the adequacy of compensation to enable the substitution of a 
remedy that is not pegged to compensation at all. 
                                                                                                                           
 123. See Steve Thel & Peter Siegelman, You Do Have to Keep Your Promises: A 
Disgorgement Theory of Contract Remedies, 52 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1181, 1200 (2011). 
As Professor Daniel Markovits explains: 
A typical example arises when a seller, breaching a land contract, con-
veys the land not to her buyer but rather to a third party who has made a 
higher offer. If the rights of the third party preclude specific perfor-
mance, then courts, treating the seller as a trustee for the initial buyer, 
award the proceeds from the second sale to this buyer as restitution. 
Daniel Markovits, Making and Keeping Contracts, 92 Va. L. Rev. 1325, 1346 (2006) (foot-
note omitted). This substitution is commonly known as monetary specific performance. 
 124. The analysis here focuses on the “inadequacy” criterion, but it may also be possi-
ble to adapt other criteria for equitable relief to permit strategic substitution. In Ebay Inc. 
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Supreme Court recently articulated four criteria for federal 
courts to consider in issuing a permanent injunction, including the “inadequate remedy at 
law” criterion. 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). But traditional equitable practice embraces prin-
ciples and concerns beyond those four factors. See Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & 
Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent 
Injunctions, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 203, 205 (2012). 
 125. This analysis may seem a tad literal or formalistic for those who see equitable-
relief criteria as more of a blank check than a real constraint on modern courts. But on 
that view, the proposed substitution strategies should be still easier to implement. The 
classic reference for the more realist view is Douglas Laycock, The Death of the 
Irreparable Injury Rule (1991). 
 126. Cf. Thel & Siegelman, supra note 123, at 1206 (“Specific performance is available 
not only when the subject of a contract cannot be obtained for any price, but also—and 
much more commonly—when it is impossible to know what the ‘correct’ price is.”). 
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2. The “Reasonable Certainty” Criterion. — Another possible avenue is 
to adapt the existing “reasonable certainty” criterion to serve a strategy 
of substitution.127 That is, rather than awarding no damages at all, courts 
could substitute disgorgement instead.128 
Whether such a use seems consonant with the spirit of this criterion 
is probably in the eye of the beholder: It might seem dissonant if one 
viewed the test as a defendant’s bulwark against ungrounded awards. But 
to the contrary, one might suggest that it is consonant to use this crite-
rion to switch to a familiar measure of damages (disgorgement) that can 
be measured with more certainty in a given case—and all the more so if 
such substitution can displace the various distortive fictions for setting 
harm-based damages that might otherwise fill the vacuum.129 
III. COMPLETING DETERRENCE? 
Given the equipoise effect, if the law is aiming for complete deter-
rence through its use of disgorgement, then it must also rely on a variety 
of further costs to “complete” the deterrence. This Part addresses two 
sets of questions that arise from this reliance: First, how well do such 
costs guarantee complete deterrence? Second, how does the presence of 
such costs affect the theory of choice equivalence and the strategy of 
substitution? 
A. Litigation Costs and Opportunity Costs 
Litigation costs accompany all remedies. These include direct litiga-
tion expenditures, of course, which may be sizable but may also be lim-
ited if a case settles. One might also include in this category the informal 
sanctions or reputational losses that may result from the fact of litigation 
or the fact of liability.130 Further costs related to litigation may include 
other economic or psychic costs; for example, the liable party may be 
                                                                                                                           
 127. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (describing the “reasonable certainty” 
criterion). 
 128. Again, in accordance with the first and second ideal conditions articulated in 
sections I.D.1–.2, it remains necessary for choice equivalence that actors perceive some 
uncertainty about whether they will face harm-based damages (that are accurate on aver-
age) or disgorgement instead. For example, an actor may suspect that harm will be some-
what hard to measure in its case and yet also remain uncertain about whether the court 
will find that measurement to be so speculative as to fail the “reasonable certainty” 
criterion. 
 129. See supra note 100 (detailing court-created fictions used in awarding patent 
damages). 
 130. See, e.g., Cardinal Health, Inc., FTC File No. 101-0006, at 4 (F.T.C. Apr. 17, 2015) 
(Wright, Comm’r, dissenting), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/ 
637771/150420cardinalhealthwright.pdf [http://perma.cc/77SL-CJ83] (“Risk averse 
companies concerned about the financial and reputational effects associated with a 
disgorgement order from the FTC could respond . . . [ex ante] by not engaging in 
conduct that could plausibly benefit consumers.”). 
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loath to confer what it sees to be a windfall on a despised opponent or a 
rival firm. These sorts of litigation-related costs are generally not offset in 
the calculation of monetary awards, including disgorgement. 
In practice, a so-called disgorgement award might also fail to 
properly offset opportunity costs or even the direct costs of the act.131 
Some such costs are more subtle than others: For example, consider an 
actor who uses an item of property without consent. This actor might 
have bargained for its use instead, leaving her sharing in the surplus. As 
some courts have acknowledged, an award that failed to account for that 
shared-surplus baseline would overshoot the true net gain attributable to 
the taking.132 This sort of opportunity cost would be properly offset if the 
disgorgement award is valued at the actor’s marginal net gain (or mar-
ginal net savings) relative to her best alternative noninfringing action. 
Some courts have intentionally ignored opportunity costs, however, 
apparently as a way to pile on an arbitrary amount of extra disincen-
tive.133 Similarly, a refusal to offset even the more direct and tangible 
costs of taking the action is sometimes a deliberate part of the remedial 
scheme, intended as a way to add a quasi-punitive surcharge beyond the 
accurate disgorgement amount.134 
B. A Fragile Deterrence 
Extraneous costs like these are what ensure complete deterrence in 
many cases. The fact that some such costs will always exist might thus 
seem to offer a way to justify our conventional shorthand equating gain-
based damages with complete deterrence.135 But this is a flimsy 
rationalization. The most obvious reason is that possible favorable motiva-
                                                                                                                           
 131. See Gergen, supra note 69, at 864 (noting that some courts recognize the need to 
offset such costs but others fail to do so). 
 132. As Judge Richard Posner classically stated in a copyright case, “[B]y forcing the 
infringer to disgorge his profit should it exceed the copyright owner’s loss the law 
discourages infringement and encourages the would-be infringer to transact with the 
copyright owner rather than ‘steal’ the copyrighted work.” Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, 
Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 931 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Gergen, supra note 69, at 830 
(“Disgorgement deters—i.e., it encourages people to bargain for the entitlements they 
use—by making someone who consciously uses an entitlement without obtaining consent 
predictably pay more in damages than he would have paid by bargaining.”). 
 133. See Gergen, supra note 69, at 830 (noting that courts sometimes “fudge the 
factual issue to award more than the likely gain . . . in order to deter” by “determin[ing] 
the wealth attributable to a wrong without resolving . . . how the wrongdoer would have 
acted differently and how a change of conduct would have affected his wealth”). 
 134. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 40 (Am. 
Law Inst. 2011) (contrasting withholding certain costs for “conscious wrongdoers” with 
refunding those costs for “innocent” wrongdoers and citing cases for support). 
 135. See supra note 8 (noting this shorthand). 
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tions, also untouched by a disgorgement award, might outweigh such 
costs.136 
Illustration—Hidden Benefits. An advertising firm breaks a 
contract with Client One to take a higher-paying contract with 
Client Two. The firm jumped at the opportunity because it has 
been hoping for years to build a relationship with Client Two, 
whose fortunes are clearly on the rise. Even if the agency must 
disgorge the direct profits from its breach, the longer-term eco-
nomic motivations would remain. Such favorable motivations 
may well outweigh the leftover costs that would otherwise have 
served as a deterrent. 
Think also of intrinsic, intangible motivations such as enjoyment or 
a sense of purpose. Consider again the former CIA analyst, Frank 
Snepp.137 The Supreme Court required him to disgorge all his profits 
from publication—noting that the harm to the government was “un-
quantifiable,” that nominal damages would be “a hollow alternative, cer-
tain to deter no one,” and that punitive damages would be “speculative 
and unusual.”138 The disgorgement solution, however, only goes so far. It 
does not defeat his nonfinancial motivations to write his whistleblowing 
book—a desire for recognition, say, or a sense of public duty. More to 
the point, he might still have written the book due to those motivations 
even if he knew that the so-called disgorgement remedy would be 
deliberately tweaked to fail to account for his time, effort, and 
opportunity costs. 
It is hardly a satisfying answer, then, to say that deterrence is ensured 
by disgorgement because we can always assume that some further costs 
are sure to exist—especially as such costs might be uncalibrated and arbi-
trary in magnitude.139 
                                                                                                                           
 136. This failure to account for how favorable motivations can outweigh the leftover 
costs can be characterized as an error of underestimating the amount to be disgorged. See 
supra note 76 and accompanying text (noting the observation by Professors Polinsky and 
Shavell that the consequences of such an underestimation, in a remedial regime that relies 
solely on gain-based damages, may be a failure to deter acts for which the harm greatly 
outweighs the gain).  
 137. See supra notes 52–55 (explaining the facts underlying Snepp’s case). 
 138. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 514–16 (1980). 
 139. Whether such arbitrariness raises a potential due process problem is bracketed 
here, but it is noteworthy that courts and commentators have forcefully raised due process 
concerns about other forms of unintended arbitrariness in remedies amounts. See, e.g., 
Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 95–118 (D. Mass. 2010) 
(Gertner, J.) (drawing on due process jurisprudence as applied to punitive damages for 
application to statutory damages), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 
2011) (rejecting Judge Nancy Gertner’s due process analysis). See generally Sheila B. 
Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten: The Problem of Statutory Damages and Class 
Actions, 74 Mo. L. Rev. 103 (2009) (raising due process concerns related to statutory dam-
ages schemes that result in unchecked or arbitrary penalties). 
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C. Effects on Choice Equivalence 
Given that such costs do exist, however, how might they affect the 
theory of choice equivalence and the strategy of substitution? To address 
this question, it is useful to distinguish between two types of additional 
costs: those that are specific to the imposition of disgorgement and those 
that attend the imposition of any remedy. 
First, note that extraneous costs specific to disgorgement may be an-
alyzed as a form of leftover incentives or errors in assessing net gains—
that is, departures from the third ideal condition, as articulated in sec-
tion I.D.3. The presence of such leftover costs leads to deviations from 
choice equivalence, which in the context of harm internalization may 
translate into deviations from optimal deterrence.140 (To be clear, how-
ever, this does not mean that the result is complete deterrence.) The 
straightforward solution is for the disgorgement award to offset such 
leftover costs. 
Next, consider the extraneous costs that are present no matter 
which remedy is awarded. For example, the actor’s litigation costs will 
not be offset if the court awards compensatory damages or expectation 
damages any more than if the court awards disgorgement. (This is assum-
ing that the so-called “American Rule” is in effect, whereby each side 
pays its own costs.)141 Similarly, reputation costs may arise from the fact 
of liability, whether the remedy is disgorgement or compensation.  
Even if the same such costs are present for either remedy, however, 
choice equivalence will be distorted. The intuition is that leftover incen-
tives loom larger under a substitution strategy, which dilutes other rele-
vant incentives, than under the usual harm-based damages regime. In the 
context of harm internalization, this asymmetry translates into a greater 
deviation from optimal deterrence. An actor expecting to pay harm-
based damages plus such extra costs is already overdeterred.142 But an 
                                                                                                                           
 140. For example, consider an actor who expects a 1/3 chance of paying accurate harm-
based damages h, leaving her with (g - h), and a 2/3 chance of disgorgement mismeasured as  
(g + x), leaving her with (-x). The incentives created are for her to act when (g - h) > 2x, 
which differs from the optimal deterrence condition (g - h) > 0. To generalize: If the actor 
expects to pay the harm-based damages with probability p > 0, and to pay disgorgement plus 
an extra cost x otherwise, then she will have incentive to act if p(g - h) - (1 - p)x > 0, or 
equivalently, (g - h) > x(1 - p)/p. Thus, assuming that the ideal decision threshold is (g - h) > 0, 
her incentives are distorted by the amount x(1 - p)/p. This implies that the greater the use 
of disgorgement relative to the harm-based damages, the larger the distortion. 
 141. See, e.g., Baker Botts L.L.P. v. Asarco LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2164 (2015) (defining 
“American Rule” and noting its strong influence). But the more general point holds even if 
there may be some fee shifting, as long as litigation costs are (or are not) offset in the same 
fashion and to the same extent whether courts award the primary remedy or disgorgement. 
 142. For example, consider the actor who expects to face litigation costs of x. If accu-
rate harm-based damages were certain to be awarded, then she is overdeterred by that 
amount x : Her incentives are to act if (g - h) > x. She is overdeterred in the sense that these 
incentives deter her from some acts for which her gains are greater than the harm she 
causes, because acting entails litigation costs. That is, assuming that the ideal decision 
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actor facing the substitution strategy along with such costs will be over-
deterred to a greater extent.143 
The ideal solution here, of course, would be to adjust both remedies 
to offset such extraneous costs. But if litigation costs cannot be offset 
when awarding compensatory or expectation damages, due to existing 
practice, a partial solution might be to adjust the disgorgement amount 
to offset litigation costs whenever the substitution occurs—that is, to 
make sure that at least the disgorgement component of the remedial mix 
is properly set. Doing so would reduce the overdeterrence to the same 
level as would naturally occur under the harm-based damages regime.144 
This is not a coincidence, but rather a straightforward application of the 
logic of choice equivalence. 
The preceding analysis has focused on harm-based damages, but it is 
worth noting that the same distortions—and the same solutions—apply 
to the use of a substitution strategy for emulating any other primary 
remedy.145 
D. The Plaintiff’s Choice 
Ensuring complete deterrence can also be accomplished by allowing 
the plaintiff to choose between harm-based and gain-based damages. 
This is a familiar structure in some areas of law—most notably, in cases of 
conscious wrongdoing, certain fiduciary breaches, and copyright viola-
                                                                                                                           
threshold is (g - h) > 0, her incentives are distorted by the amount x. (If, however, one 
considers litigation costs to be a social loss, then one might say she is not overdeterred in 
the sense that she is internalizing all social gains and losses.) 
 143. Consider the same actor. Suppose that she expects a 1/3 chance of paying harm-
based damages along with litigation costs of x and a 2/3 chance of paying disgorgement 
along with the same costs. Her incentives are to act when (g - h) > 3x. Notice that this implies 
a departure from both choice equivalence and optimal deterrence (even if one counts the 
litigation costs x as a social loss). To generalize: If the actor expects to pay harm-based 
damages and an extra cost x both with probability p > 0, and to pay disgorgement and the 
extra cost x otherwise, then she will have incentive to act if p(g - h - x) - (1 - p)x > 0, or 
equivalently, (g - h) > (x/p). Thus, assuming that the ideal decision threshold is (g - h) > 0,  
her incentives are distorted by the amount (x/p). This also implies that the greater the use of 
disgorgement relative to the harm-based damages, the larger the distortion. 
 144. Continuing the same illustration, the actor now expects a 1/3 chance of paying 
harm-based damages along with the litigation costs of x, and a 2/3 chance of paying dis-
gorgement with no litigation costs. Her incentives are to act when (g - h) > x. To 
generalize: If the actor expects to pay harm-based damages and an extra cost x both with 
probability p > 0, and to pay only disgorgement otherwise, then she will have incentive to 
act if p(g - h - x) > 0, or equivalently, (g - h) > x. Thus, assuming that the ideal decision 
threshold is (g - h) > 0, her incentives are distorted by the amount x. This is the same 
distortion as when harm-based damages along with an extra cost x are always awarded. See 
supra note 142 and accompanying text (describing such distortion). 
 145. This can be seen by replacing h with r in the expressions above, where r generi-
cally represents the value of any primary remedy. Cf. supra section I.A. (demonstrating the 
logic of choice equivalence in the context of any primary remedy, generically labeled r). 
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tions.146 It is well understood how allowing plaintiffs the choice can lead 
to complete deterrence, but the mechanism is worth reviewing briefly 
here as a preface to analyzing how it affects the choice-equivalence analy-
sis and the strategy of substitution. 
1. Extreme Selection Bias. — Consider the classic case of the egg-wash-
ing machine, Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co.147 At the height of World War II, 
when labor was in short supply, a man named Olwell discovered that the 
packing company next door had surreptitiously used his “Eggsact” egg-
washing machine. Orwell had sold his own packing business to the com-
pany—except for this particular machine. They had used his machine 
without permission for three years (and rebuffed his offers to sell or rent 
it to them).148 
But it so happened that Olwell had no intention of using the ma-
chine himself during that time; nor had he sought to rent it or sell it to 
others.149 In short, he had suffered no actual harm. Even more fortu-
nately for him, the Washington Supreme Court used his case to make a 
strong statement about the plaintiff’s freedom to choose between a 
harm-based torts remedy and a gain-based restitutionary remedy.150 Not 
surprisingly, he chose to pursue an award based on disgorging his neigh-
bor’s gains.151 
What sorts of incentives does such a remedial structure produce for 
a potential tortfeasor or contract breacher? Consider an actor who does 
not know whether harm will exceed gains or vice versa. What she can 
predict is that if the harms exceed her gains, the plaintiff will choose 
                                                                                                                           
 146. See Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 931 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(including classic statement by Judge Posner explaining why an infringer may be forced to 
disgorge profits if such profit exceeds the amount of harm to the copyright holder); Omri 
Ben-Shahar, Damages for Unlicensed Use, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 7, 13–16 (2011) (analyzing 
the incentive effects of several variations of such “greater of” regimes in intellectual prop-
erty); Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1039, 
1048 (2011) (“In the event of the fiduciary’s breach of duty, the principal is entitled to an 
election among remedies that include compensatory damages to offset any losses or to 
makeup any gains . . . or to disgorgement by the fiduciary of any profit accru[ed] [from] 
breach.”). 
 147. 173 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1946). 
 148. Id. at 652–53. 
 149. Id. at 653–54. 
 150. Id. at 653 (“[I]n cases where the defendant tort feasor has benefited by his wrong, 
the plaintiff may elect to ‘waive the tort’ and bring an action in assumpsit for restitution. 
Such an action arises out of a [legal] duty . . . upon the defendant to repay an unjust and 
unmerited enrichment.”). 
 151. Id. And still more fortunately for Olwell, the measure of gains that the court 
adopted was remarkably high; it has received much academic criticism as being overkill. 
See, e.g., Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain?, supra note 20, at 1348–49 (criticizing the 
court’s measure and proposing several more plausible alternative measures).  
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compensatory damages, and the rest of the time the plaintiff will choose 
disgorgement.152 
Illustration—Copyright Damages. The Hawk publishing com-
pany is considering copying and selling a booklet of income tax 
worksheets that is extremely similar to a booklet an author 
named Buck has created and copyrighted. Hawk does not know 
whether its profits from the infringement will exceed Buck’s lost 
profits, but it knows that copyright law will allow Buck the op-
tion of seeking either disgorgement or compensation.153 
Looking ahead, the company sees no chance of a net gain, but only 
some chance of breaking even and otherwise a net loss. Expecting a net 
loss on average, the company is completely deterred—as copyright law 
apparently intended.154 
This complete deterrence effect is quite familiar.155 But seeing it 
from the perspective of the equipoise effect does leave us with a some-
what unusual conclusion: In a sense, it is the harm-based damages that are 
responsible for complete deterrence.156 The reason is that an extreme 
form of selection bias is at work.157 And this selectivity, combined with the 
                                                                                                                           
 152. If the harm happens to equal the gains, whether the plaintiff chooses to call it 
compensatory damages or disgorgement does not matter for the analysis (because the 
actor does not know this fact beforehand); for convenience, the exposition here will call it 
disgorgement. 
 153. This illustration is based loosely on Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 
F.3d 923, 931 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (“A copyright owner can sue for his losses or for 
the infringer’s profits, but not for the sum of the two amounts . . . . The copyright owner is 
allowed to waive damages (lost profits) and sue for the infringer’s gain.”). The possibility 
of statutory damages is bracketed here. See Huang, supra note 8, at 748–50 (describing 
and analyzing statutory damages for copyright infringement); Pamela Samuelson & Tara 
Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 439, 471–73 (2009) (noting pathologies of statutory damages in copyright). 
 154. See Bucklew, 329 F.3d at 931 (“[B]y forcing the infringer to disgorge his profit 
should it exceed the copyright owner’s loss the law discourages infringement . . . .”). 
 155. See, e.g., id. (recognizing how the plaintiff’s election of remedies can serve com-
plete deterrence); Ben-Shahar, supra note 146, at 13–16 (same); Sitkoff, supra note 146, at 
1048 (same); see also Eisenberg, supra note 96, at 577 (“Generally speaking . . . a promi-
see will seek disgorgement damages only when they exceed expectation damages. There-
fore, protection of the disgorgement interest would provide the promisor with excessive 
incentives for performance and precaution.”). For a behavioral economics analysis of the 
incentive effects of such election of remedies, see Oren Bar-Gill, Pricing Legal Options: A 
Behavioral Perspective, 1 Rev. L. & Econ. 204, 229–31 (2005). 
 156. But what about an actor who knows whether the harms will be higher than the 
gains? The situation looks even stranger: This actor is deterred when the harms exceed the 
gains; the rest of the time, the actor faces equipoise (and so achieving complete deter-
rence must rely again on nonremedial costs). Cf. Sitkoff, supra note 146, at 1048 (“But 
compensatory damages deter breach only when the gains to the breaching party are less 
than the nonbreaching party’s loss.”). 
 157. One qualification: If, for whatever reason, the actor does not expect that the fu-
ture plaintiff will always choose the higher amount, this will temper the selection bias and 
complete deterrence will not be so sure. One might also imagine reasons why a plaintiff 
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equipoise effect, is what guarantees the overall net loss. In essence, the 
resulting incentives are choice equivalent with harm-based damages that 
are sure to be greater than the actor’s gain. 
2. Consequences for Legal Design. — Simply allowing the plaintiff to 
choose between disgorgement and compensation can thus create com-
plete deterrence. The actor does not even need to have a good guess of 
how often the harms might exceed her gains. As long as she expects some 
chance that the harms will exceed gains, then she will be completely de-
terred. This is rather convenient if the law’s aim is complete deterrence.158  
This effect may be troubling, though, if the law’s aim is harm inter-
nalization. Is there any way to return to optimal deterrence? This ques-
tion circles back to the ideal conditions articulated in section I.D. The 
second condition, the accuracy of the primary remedy, has failed in a 
spectacular way. Here the issue is not just missing the target of true harm. 
Now the problem is overshooting the actor’s gains. 
Recognizing this distinctive mechanism introduces some conceptual 
clarity—but also some pessimism—in crafting workarounds. One ap-
proach is to limit the option of disgorgement to public enforcers, rather 
than private plaintiffs. One might sensibly assume that private plaintiffs 
will naturally choose whichever form of damages offers a higher 
amount.159 While this motivation might also be true of public enforcers 
in some contexts, in others it might not. When public enforcers value 
optimal deterrence, they may instead pursue substitution in a way that 
emulates harm internalization. A second approach is to set boundaries 
on when the plaintiff should be allowed the choice—for example, by set-
ting a liability threshold,160 or by establishing prerequisites such as a find-
ing of bad intent. This confines complete deterrence to unacceptable 
                                                                                                                           
might prefer (or end up) seeking one remedy or the other, even if it is not necessarily the 
higher-value remedy. See Farnsworth, Restitution, supra note 28, at 62 (noting “restitution 
may be preferable . . . if the defendants’ gains are easier to prove than the plaintiff’s 
losses”). 
 158. “Convenient” is the word of choice. If complete deterrence is really the aim, why 
not just take a more direct approach—say, through punitive damages, civil penalties, or 
criminal liability? One plausible answer might be that there are contexts in which com-
plete deterrence is thought to be the aim but “punishment” is not. See generally Doug 
Rendleman, Measurement of Restitution: Coordinating Restitution with Compensatory 
Damages and Punitive Damages, 68 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 973, 998–1005 (2011) (analyzing 
the mystifying relationship between disgorgement and punitive damages in the law of 
restitution). 
 159. It is worth a reminder here that a private plaintiff may have various reasons for not 
choosing the higher amount. For clarity’s sake, the exposition here assumes that she will. 
 160. Recall that the basic logic of choice equivalence does not require any initial 
weighing of harms and gains at the liability stage. But if allowing the plaintiff a free choice 
of remedies entails complete deterrence, then adding a liability threshold may become 
necessary for optimal deterrence. 
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versions of the act, while keeping harm internalization for the more tol-
erable sorts.161 
CONCLUSION 
One further observation emerges from this exploration of the equi-
poise effect. Recall the tech start-up founder, whom we met in the Intro-
duction. Imagine that she anticipates having to disgorge her profits, 
should she infringe the patent. If that were all, she would be in equi-
poise. But what if she also expected some chance that the court might 
substitute harm-based damages instead?162 This would introduce a new 
incentive—one requiring her to weigh gains against harms. 
This shift of perspective in how we see our familiar mix of remedies 
also prepares us to revisit how we see harm-based damages operating 
alone. We can think of an award of harm-based damages as being the 
sum of two parts: an amount that is equal to gains, and an amount that is 
equal to the difference between harms and gains.163 The first piece puts 
the actor in equipoise, and the second piece introduces a further incen-
tive requiring her to weigh gains against harms. Look familiar? We thus 
arrive at another way of appreciating how harm-based damages work: 
They introduce a desired incentive—after first finding equipoise. 
                                                                                                                           
 161. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 40 cmt. b 
(Am. Law Inst. 2011) (distinguishing an “innocent” violator from a “conscious 
wrongdoer”); cf. Richard Craswell, When Is a Willful Breach “Willful”? The Link Between 
Definitions and Damages, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1501 (2009) (analyzing how the scope of the 
meaning of “willful” should influence the setting of limitations on damages); Alex 
Raskolnikov, Irredeemably Inefficient Acts: A Threat to Markets, Firms, and the Fisc, 102 
Geo. L.J. 1133, 1136–37 (2014) (distinguishing between contingently and irredeemably 
inefficient acts and emphasizing the role of the actor’s intent). 
 162. Note that this is also how the illustration based on the Snepp case was initially 
framed, in section I.B, with future whistleblowers anticipating disgorgement as the default 
remedy, while also anticipating some chance of paying harm-based damages instead. 
 163. That is, h = g + (h - g). Note that the same shift in perspective can also be applied 
to any other primary remedy—that is, r = g + (r - g).  
